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Abstract
MANAGING A PORTFOLIO OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS WITH SEVERAL
DELIVERY CHOICES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS - THE CASE OF
GREECE AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
by
Spyros Tzoannos
Submitted to the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
on December 18, 1997 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering
100 years ago the use of private infrastructure development was widespread
around the world. However, after World War II, it became common practice, for most
civil infrastructure projects in the Western World to be developed by the public sector.
Today, there is a trend back to private sector involvement in all aspects of project
delivery. These include the planning, financing, construction, operation and maintenance
of projects.
Four delivery systems are discussed in this Thesis. These.are Design Bid Build
(DBB), Design Build (DB), Design Build Operate (DBO), and Build Operate Transfer
(BOT). These four systems are used to represent the various combinations of
responsibilities surrounding the delivery of a project.
Greece is a country which has a great need for infrastructure. Unfortunately public
funds are scarce. The traditional approach to this problem would be to deliver as many
projects as possible using the funding which is available, while simply delaying other
projects until funds are made available. This however is no longer the case. Like many
other countries Greece has realized that there is a positive correlation between
infrastructure and the national economy. Also, there is great pressure from the EU for the
development of a strong infrastructure system. Because of these reasons, Greece has
tapped into the private market for the delivery of the projects for which it does not have
the necessary resources. A discussion of Greece's infrastructure program is examined
along with the benefits which the country is beginning to realize from alternate delivery
systems.
One of the projects in the massive Greek Infrastructure Portfolio is the new
International Airport. The Airport can be considered as one project or as several. The
role of the government in its delivery was twofold. First it had to decide how to package
the Airport Projects, and second, it had to decide how to deliver each package. Three
packages were created. One included everything directly related with the operations of
the Airport, another dealt with the new highway, and the third involved the development
of the surrounding land. An attempt to evaluate the boundaries of each project is
included. Also, the choice of delivery method is discussed. The Airport is considered as
BOT by the press (even though, as defined in this thesis, it lies between BOT and DBO),
the highway is BOT, and the development of the land is yet to be assigned a description.
Furthermore, the delivery of the Airport project is examined. The Airport itself is
further separated into twenty seven projects which the government has lumped together
and passed on to a concession company: Athens International Airport S.A. It is
responsible for a large portfolio of projects to be delivered with limited resources. This
company must decide: (1) what packages to split the Airport into and (2) how to deliver
these packages. A method on deciding how to manage and deliver the portfolio is
presented taking advantage of the benefits of alternate delivery systems.
Some of the conclusions which are reached in the paper:
* It is important to look at all the delivery methods and not to lock oneself into one
method. They all have benefits which can only be realized if they are matched with a
compatible project.
* The owner should have a clear understanding of what is required so that the project
can be delivered properly. The planning is the most important part of the project.
* The benefits of alternate delivery system can be realized by owners in either the public
or the private sectors.
* Lumping financial "winners" and "losers" facilitates delivery.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor John B. Miller
Title: Assistant Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Private infrastructure development is not a new concept. In fact, 100 years ago
most major projects were being developed using very little support from the public sector.
However, in the mid-1900's most infrastructure in the United States and in many other
countries around the world became the responsibility of the government. It became
common practice for governments to plan, finance, operate and manage infrastructure
projects. Today there appears to be a shift away from the plenary public control of
infrastructure project development. The public sector is tapping into the private markets
for financing and/or development of infrastructure projects such as highways,
powerstations, airports, and bridges to name just a few.
In this thesis it will be investigated how all the delivery options which exist today
can be utilized to deliver projects where the owner is either in the public sector or the
private sector. The point which is stressed mostly is that all of the delivery options should
be examined, since each project (including its significant parts) is unique. Each delivery
method has attributes which are aligned differently with particular projects.
This thesis uses Greece as an example of the public sector. Greece is a country
which has had a commitment to government provided infrastructure. Recently, however,
this country too has changed its attitude and is looking at other options for delivering its
needed infrastructure. Greece has a relatively weak economy and also lacks a lot of
needed infrastructure. The benefit of using alternate delivery systems as a means of
providing needed infrastructure in a country which cannot afford to deliver it via
traditional means will be demonstrated.
The New Athens Airport
Brief History
Plans for a new airport to serve the Greek capital, Athens, first came about in 1975
under the administration of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis' plan for "long term
regional economic development". ' In 1976, the government performed a feasibility study
to decide on a location for the new airport. The area of Zagani in Spata was selected from
a list of 18 potential locations, as the most appropriate location. The Master Plan was
presented to the government, and the year 2000 was set as a time limit for a new airport.
In 1978 the Greek Government established a state owned company called "Athens
Airport S.A." Its purpose was to plan, construct, develop, and operate the new airport.
The company was set up, to function along "private sector economic criteria, for the
public sector's interest". That same year, all the necessary land was expropriated from the
public and the earthwork commenced.
In 1982 there was a revision to the Master Plan,2 and in 1987 all work was halted
and the project was terminated. At that point about one third of the earthwork had been
completed. The delays and final termination of the project were caused mostly by financial
constraints. The country was going through an economic crisis, and thus there was no
public money left to be allocated to the project.
' Athens International Airport, "Historical Background Timeline", 1996.
2 Athens International Airport, "Historical Background Timeline", 1996.
In 1991 there was a new administration in office with a new agenda. It decided to
recommence the Airport Project. An environmental impact study was performed by a
group of foreign and Greek consulting engineers. This study examined the environmental
consequences to the broader area of the airport.3
That same year, as the world trend for private/public partnerships in infrastructure
was become more and more popular, the government decided that this project should be
constructed and developed using the system of concession. Nine companies expressed
interest in the RFQ. Four companies were invited in the RFP. The RFP invited the
bidding groups to submit bids for the design, construction, financing operation and
maintenance of the new International Airport. The winning bidder would become a 65%
equity owner (in partnership with the Greek government) of a new company called Athens
International Airport. This company would be operated by the winning bidder. Athens
International Airport would have the right to own and operate the airport for 50 years,
after which the ownership would return to the Greek State. The selection criteria used
included the quality of the proposal in meeting certain threshold criteria and the amount of
cash which the bidder was willing to contribute for the 65% equity share. Also, the
airport company was given the right to develop an area around the Airport.4 The four
bidders were British Aerospace plc, the German group Hochtief AG, Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., and the French Socite Auxilaire d'Entreprises S.A. (SAE). The following
year (1992) two consortia were short listed. These were Hochtief and SAE.
3 Athens International Airport, "Historical Background Timeline", 1996.
4 Request for Proposals: "The New International Airport at Spata" 23 December 1991. Article 1.1.
The consortium which was led by Hochtief was selected as the winner in July of
1993. However, a few hours before the signing of the agreement in September of 1993,
the conservative ruling government fell and negotiations stopped. The results of the
political elections brought a socialist government to power. The country was again ruled
by Papandreou and his political party PASOK. The same party which ruled the country
during the 1980's.
The airport however was also included in the agenda of the PASOK government.
The government issued a new RFP. This new RFP changed several provisions of the
original tender documents including the equity share of the Greek State in the project from
35 to 55%, the change in the term of the concession from 50 to 30 years, and the
elimination of the right to develop a "buffer zone" surrounding the airport from the
contract. The selection criteria remained the same - highest equity contribution. The two
short listed consortia were only invited to resubmit bids. Several months later the French
consortium filed a complaint with the European Union concerning the bidding procedure.
In October of 1994 the selecting committee chose the consortium led by Hochtief
to be the partner of Greece in the construction, development and operation of the new
International Airport. The final choice was made based on the highest contribution of
equity which was approximately 8% of the total project cost.5 In July of 1995 the
"Airport Development Agreement" was signed between the Greek State and the
consortium. The companies which had formed the consortium were: Hochtief A.G., ABB
' Infrastructure Finance, "Athens International Airport" September 9, 1996.
Calor, Emag Shaltanlagen AG, Krantz-TKT GmbH and Flughafen Athen-Spata
Projectgesellschaft mbH.
In May of 1996 the European Union released the funding package after it ruled
that the award was not made according to anti-competitive means. Following the release
of funds, the agreement was ratified by parliament in June. Also, in June the new airport
company was formed - Athens International Airport S.A_ The next day, the construction
contract was signed.6
September 5t 1996 was the day that work recommenced in the new Airport
project.
The Project
The new International Airport has been named "Eleftherios Venizelos" after one of
the most important political leaders of modern Greek history. This new airport will
replace the existing outdated and over congested current international airport. The airport
is currently the biggest infrastructure project in Greece.
The technical characteristics are summarized in Figure 1.1. The location which
was chosen for the airport is a region 18 km from Athens. It is an area which is
surrounded by hills, and is quite underdeveloped. Figure 1.2 is a plan view of the entire
airport as it will be in its initial stage of operation.
6 Athens International Airport, "Historical Background Timeline", 1996.
Total Cost: DM 4.11 billion
Construction Period: 56 months
Total Passengers: 16 million/yr. initially expandable to 50 million/yr.
Number of Runways: 2 parallel for simultaneous take-offs/landings
Aircraft Movements: Up to 600 take-offs/landings per day
Aircraft Stands: 89
Main Terminal: 4 levels, 14 jetways
Satellite: 10 jetways
Cargo facilities: 220,000 tons/year
Access: Six lane access road from south. Available space for potential future
rail link to city
Fig. 1.1. Technical Characteristics
A six lane highway is being built simultaneously using a separate concession. It is
a 72km toll road, estimated at $1.85 billion. Both the Airport and highway are expected
to be complete by the year 2000.7 Because of the new Airport and Highway it is certain
that there will be major commercial opportunities in the surrounding area. The
government has not included the development of the area in either of the concessions. (As
already mentioned the commercial development of part of the surrounding area was
included in the conservative government's proposal, however the socialists removed that
clause from the second proposal.)
In this thesis, the Airport, part of the Highway, and the development of the
surrounding area will be considered collectively as a portfolio of projects - "the Airport
Project." The government chose to "unbundle" "the Airport Project" into these parts.
The Airport Company, AIA, is responsible for a portfolio of projects which is
called the Airport. The bulk of the projects in its portfolio are being constructed by
7 Privatization International, "Athens Airport Link Finalized" April 1. 1996.
Hochtief and its partners who have been awarded a construction contract: the Identified
Construction Contract (ICC). It includes the foundation work, terminal buildings,
runways, lighting, etc. It is a "typical" Design Build contract. However, there are another
30 or so sub-projects which are not included in the ICC and are the responsibility of AIA
to deliver. These include: the catering facilities, fuel farm, cargo facilities, hotel,
convention center, parking garages, etc. AIA has planned to deliver some of these
projects as DBB, while others are to be given out using alternate delivery methods.
The Thesis - what will be examined
The goal of this thesis is to gain a better understand of how the delivery methods,
which exist today, can be used by project owners (or sponsors), either by the public or the
private sector, as tools for delivering projects efficiently when there are limited financial
resources. To achieve this goal, the case study approach will be taken using Greece as an
example for the public sector, while for the private sector, the new Athens Airport will be
studied.
What will be looked at are three things: (1) the choices the Greek government is
making concerning the delivery of its infrastructure projects; (2) the choice which the
government made concerning the Airport delivery; and (3) the choices which AIA has to
make concerning the delivery of each project which it is in charge of.
The benefits of alternate delivery methods have been seen in many projects and in
many countries all around the world. In this analysis it will be demonstrated that the
benefits which the public sector is beginning to enjoy by using alternate delivery methods
can also be realized by a profit driven private sector which is placed in the same position
as government planners.
This is not a thesis in transportation engineering. Rather, it is an analysis of a topic
in Construction Management, or Infrastructure Development Systems. The airport is
simply taken as a "megaproject". Megaprojects have been defined as large projects such
as dams, steel mills, highways, tunnels, and airports.g These projects are ones which have
a powerful appeal for symbolic as well as practical reasons.
The airport is not a simple business. It consists of many different businesses all
different in the service that they provide. Yet, all these services are interrelated. This is
why an airport was selected for this thesis. An airport is a "basket" of projects all of
which must be delivered. How these are to be delivered will be examined.
From my analysis, I hope one of the biggest understandings which will come out is
that one should not only think in a certain direction - there is an entire spectrum of
delivery methods, each suited for a project. The Greek government chose to deliver the
Airport using a Build Operate Transfer system. The Airport company, must now decide
how to deliver each project in its "basket". By choosing the most suitable delivery method
for each project involved, the Airport company's returns can be maximized.
8 Szyliowicz, Joseph S and Goetz, Andrew R "Getting realistic about megaproject planning" in Policy
Sciences. v28n4 Nov. 1995 p. 347-367
Figure 1.2 - Plan of Airport
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Figure 1.2- Plan of Airport (continued)
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CHAPTER 2: Background Information
Before any analysis can be made, certain background information must be
presented. That is what this chapter is about. It begins with an introduction to the
delivery systems which will be used in this analysis and how they are defined. Then there
is a discussion of the European Union's strategy concerning infrastructure, and a
description of the European Investment Bank.
Discussion of available delivery options
Delivery method is a term to describe how a constructed facility or "project" is to
be "delivered". This includes design, finance, construction, operation and maintenance.
"Traditionally," that is after World War II, infrastructure projects were delivered
according to the following: (1) The government decides that it needs a new infrastructure
project; (2) It then selects a design team to design it, and perform the engineering analysis;
(3) Once this is done, it issues an RFP for the construction phase of the project; (4) The
contracting team is then selected (usually based on the lowest bid); (5) When the
construction phase of the project is complete, the project is handed over to the
government and it then must operate the facility. Throughout the delivery the financing
had been arranged by the government. This method will be referred to as Design bid build
(DBB).
DBB has been the only way for governments to procure infrastructure in many
countries since the 1950s. However, as public resources have become scarce and projects
have become more complex, governments have been forced to change their priorities, and
several other delivery methods have re-emerged. These include design build, design build
operate, turnkey, build operate transfer, and numerous other variations.
The traditional delivery method has not always been the "traditional" method. In
fact if one is to look back in history, most projects have been traditionally delivered using
a "system" approach (as will be discussed below), which many times included private
funding.
Four generic delivery methods will be considered in this analysis. These are
Design Bid Build (DBB), Design Build (DB), Design Build Operate (DBO), and Build
Operate Transfer (BOT). These four names will be used as generic titles as there exist
variations of each method. Miller9 has created a matrix based on project delivery and
source of financing as a means of distinguishing each of the delivery methods. The matrix,
is presented in figure 2.1 along with the location of the delivery method in each quadrant.
9 Miller, John B., Engineering Systems Integration for Civil Infrastructure Projects, Journal of
Management in Engineering, September/October 1997, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 61-69.
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Fig. 2.1. Common Delivery Methods in Operation Framework'o
The matrix is from the point of view of the group issuing the RFP (also referred to
as the owner or promoter). It need not be a public sector owner. The vertical axis
represents the funding source. Direct means that the promoter is the source of funding or
assumes the funding risk for the project, while indirect means that the contracting body
takes care of it. The horizontal line represents how the project is delivered. The steps to
delivery are the following: planning, design, construction, operations, maintenance, and
finance. Segmented means that these steps are contractually separated (taken one at a
time in a sequence), while system means that they are combined together into one
package.
10 Miller, John B., Engineering Systems Integration for Civil Infrastructure Projects. Journal of
Management in Engineering, September/October 1997, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 61-69.
A short description of each of the delivery methods which will be looked at in this
paper will follow:
Design Bid Build
Fig. 2.2. Schematic of DBB
The design bid build system is summarized schematically in Figure 2.211. What is
happening in this process, is that the promoter of the project has identified a need. He
then holds a design competition to select a design team- The design team is selected to
perform the architectural and engineering duties. Then once the design is completed a
construction competition is held. Construction companies are invited to bid on the design,
and the lowest qualified bidder is then selected. Once the construction phase is complete,
the project is returned to the owner who must handle the operation and maintenance
throughout the life of the project. Financing for all this is the responsibility of the owner.
" Figures are revisions of one found in The Privatization Book by Goldman and Mok-aos
Cornstruction Contract
"Design Contract
cing Design/Detailed
Description of Project
Owner Competition
& Owner Financing
Constructioon
Owner Operation & Maintenance
This method works well if the project cannot carry its own weight financially; in
other words, if revenues generated by the project are not enough to cover its investment
or operating costs, and public funds are available, and dedicated to the facility.
Disadvantages would be that the promoter must handle all the financing costs, the process
takes time (since the steps cannot be overlapped), and there is no interaction between the
design people and the construction people which could lead to cost savings.
Design Build
Fig. 2.3. Schematic of DB
The owner hires one team or business entity to perform both the design and
construction of the project.2 See figure 2.3. Operations, maintenance, and finance are
12 Gordon, Christopher M., Choosing Appropriate Construction Contracting Method, Journal of
Construction Engineering and Management, March 1994, Vol. 120, No. 1, pp. 196-210.
Owner Operation & Maintenance
still the responsibility of the owner. By doing this, the design and construction phase of
the project can be overlapped allowing the project to be completed faster and often at a
lower cost. However, the promoter has lost a great deal of control over the design of the
project and if factors such as aesthetics are very important, DB should not be considered.
Except for the merging of the design and construction phases, DB resembles DBB.
Design Build Operate
Fig. 2.4. Schematic of DBO
Miller 13 defines Design Build Operate (DBO) as the "middle ground" between
design-build and BOT. It is very similar to BOT (also located in the system side of the
matrix). See Figure 2.4. The difference lies in the nature of the cash flows arranged by
M3Miller, John B. "Infrastructure Development in Hong Kong", Aligning Infrastructure Development to
Meet Current Public Needs, MIT Thesis 1995.
the project promoter to the DBO team. These cash flows may take the form of
competitively established fees for service, guarantees of usage, or minimum purchases.
In DBO, one entity is responsible for design, construction, maintenance, operation,
and at the same time takes advantage of owner arranged cash flows sufficient to finance
the facility. This allows for fastracking, and provides a long enough project for the DBO
team to arrange (and pay off) both construction and long term project finance, based upon
the strength of owner arranged cash flows during the operation of the project. Also, by
placing the responsibility of delivery on one entity added efficiency is realized.
This method is usually used in projects which can be handled more efficiently by
the private sector and where owner arranged cash-flow streams either encourage private
sector competition and/or lower finance associated risk.
Build Operate Transfer
Fig. 2.5. Schematic of BOT
In a pure BOT arrangement, the owner/promoter establishes one team to provide
the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the project at the
owner's financial risk. After a certain pre-arranged period of time, ownership of the
project returns to the promoter. In its purest form the role of the owner/promoter is to
identify the need, conduct preliminary studies, and issue the RFP. See figure 2.5. In a
BOT arrangement the promoter does not offer guarantees such as minimum quantity
purchased. Therefore the entire cash flow risk usually resides with the BOT team and not
the promoter.
Good BOT candidates are projects which (1) are feasible in terms of design,
construction and operation; (2) generate reliable and stable revenues; (3) offer a good
return on investment to private sector participants.14
DBO and BOT have been incorrectly called "privatization", but the word has little
meaning when one recognizes that all the common delivery methods rely on "private"
sector funds to provide the components of civil infrastructure projects. Much of the
literature simply equates DBO with BOT. However, the two are quite different. They are
distinguished in terms of the fundamental nature of the financial risks taken by the DBO
and BOT franchisees.
In many countries it has become accepted that DBO and BOT methods not only
help finance the project but also bring efficiency to it. In general, selection of delivery
14 Miller, John B. "Infrastructure Development in Hong Kong", Aligning Infrastructure Development to
Meet Current Public Needs, MIT Thesis 1995.
methods to the right side of Figure 2.1 (the System side) are believed to be more efficient
because: 15
* Competitive forces across a wider range of project elements tend to drive inefficiency
out of the market-place
* Managerial and operational decisions can be made without the pressures of politics
* The repercussions of decisions are felt directly by the decision makers in terms of
profits and losses
Understanding that there is a whole list of choices for delivery methods is very
important for project planners. By matching the most appropriate method to a project, a
more efficient outcome results. Also, in some cases if the alternate delivery methods did
not exist the project would not have been delivered at all. This is especially true for BOT
in dealing with the projects in developing countries. Many of those country do not have
the resources to fund major infrastructure projects. Tapping into the private sector allows
these projects to be completed. This does not imply that developed countries cannot take
advantage of BOT. Indeed just the opposite may be true. By allowing projects to finance
themselves, scarce public funds are released to be invested in other uses. However, it is
also important to remember that BOT is not the solution for all projects. This is one of
the key points of this thesis. Each delivery method is appropriate for certain projects in a
given portfolio. By matching the two, a more efficient outcome is realized.
'5 Goldman, Harvey and Mokuvos, Sandra. The Privatization Book- New York: Arthur Young
International, 1984: p. 15
Usually, the promoter is considered to be the government. This is because the
public sector traditionally provides infrastructure to the community. However, as will be
seen in this paper, the promoter can also be a private entity, and take advantage of the
benefits which exist from project delivery alternatives.
The role of the European Union
"People and goods cannot move freely without the means to do so. The Union
must now ensure that it has the transport systems which are up to the task." 16 The
European Commission believes that by taking advantage of the free trade policy which
exists in Europe, and combining it with a strong transport system, a greater level of
prosperity for the Union will result. At the same time, by building this strong transport
system, it is the belief of the European Commission, that people will be able to travel
around more easily and freely and so the various cultures and peoples will be able to
integrate with one another, making a stronger union."
The problem which existed 10 years ago (and is being improved daily) is that
instead of having a transportation network, Europe has more of a transportation
"patchwork." "Europe's transport network features motorways which come to an abrupt
end at frontiers, railways with incompatible power and signaling systems, and air services
which are managed by 52 air traffic control centres..."'~ The goal of the EU is to create a
network which will better link all the member states. The European Commission has
'6 European Commission, The Trans-European Network: Transforming a patchwork into a network.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission, 1995
'7 The Group of Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or Government, Report: Trans-European
networks. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission, 1995
" The Group of Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or Government, Report: Trans-European
networks. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission, 1995
estimated this network to cost approximately ECU 400 billion by 2010. The network will
include 70,000 km of rail track, 15,000 km of new roads (added to 58,000 km which are
largely built), 267 airports of common interest, and waterways and seaports.
The Commission describes five "dividends" which will raise the quality of life for
the peoples of Europe. These are economic, safety, reduced congestion, cleaner
environment, and added choices for the traveler.
The Maastricht Treaty (November 1993) established trans-European networks in
transport, energy, and telecommunications as objectives for the Union. The responsibility
of creating the network remains with the Member states. However, the EU would (i)
identify projects of common interest, (ii) back projects by financing feasibility studies and
providing loan guarantees or interest rate subsidies, and (iii) take steps to ensure that the
networks are "interoperable." The EU is expected to act as a catalyst for the projects by
trying to find ways around financial and regulatory obstacles for the member states.
In Essen (in 1994), the European Council endorsed a proposal which named 14
projects as Union priorities (includes PATHE and Egnatia in Greece). The Greek Airport
was listed as a project of importance (but not priority). The projects of priority where
chosen based on size, economic viability, attractiveness to private investors, and whether
they could be launched within two years.
Because of the level of investments needed and the lack of funds available, the
European Union hopes to optimize the use of public funds by combining them with
private. As a general rule, subsidies should not exceed the amount which is strictly needed
to achieve a particular objective.
There are four options which the EU can exercise in funding projects. These are:
grant financing, equity financing, loan financing, and guarantees.
The European Union has established four sources of funding for projects:
I. Union Budget: in 1995, ECU 1.8 billion was allocated through 1999 for feasibility
studies, loan guarantees, and grants.
II. Structural Funds:
A. European Regional Development Fund: ECU 15 billion for transportation
projects through 1999
B. Cohesion Fund: ECU 8 billion for Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland
III. European Investment Bank
IV. European Investment Fund: Began in 1994, the EIF had a capital of ECU 2 billion
(1995). It is 30% privately owned. When it first began it provided only loan
guarantees. Starting in 1997 it may provide equity financing as well.
The European Investment Bank
The European Investment Bank was founded by the treaty of Rome. 19 Members
of the Bank are the Member states of the European Union, and its mission is the financing
of projects which promote the idea of European union Most of its activities are within
19 European Investment Bank. Promotion of the European Completion: Investments in Greece. 1995
the Union, however there is some participation in countries outside of the EU. In 1996,
ECU 23.2 billion were lent making it the largest financial institution in the world. Because
of its AAA rankings and its not-for-profit objectives the EIB is able to lend funds under
the best terms. Loans are given to both the public and private sector. For industrial
projects, terms range from 5 to 12 years, while for infrastructure, they may exceed 20
years.
The EIB evaluates all projects which it is asked to finance. First it evaluates the
projects economically and technically. Then it sees whether or not the projects meet other
criteria, such as: the economic development of a region, improvement of European
infrastructure, the promotion of the competitiveness of the European Industry, and
protection of the natural environment.
Loans which are provided by the EIB can cover up to 50% of the cost of the
project and so it is expected that the promoter seeks other sources of finance as well.
Also, the funds are usually lent in the currency of the nation where the investment
opportunity is located, and so the EIB must hold funds in all currencies.
CHAPTER 3: The government's strategy
Greece and Infrastructure Developments
Private project finance is not new to Greece; it was used over 100 years ago for
the building of the Corinth Canal. The same was true for the electricity, water supply, and
railway systems. However, private financing gave way to solely publicly financed projects
until the late 1980's.20 Build Operate Transfer methods have started to creep into the
Greek infrastructure industry. Legislative reforms in 198421 allowed other delivery
methods such as Design Build and Build Operate Transfer for the delivery of
infrastructure.
Currently over 75 major (and many more minor) infrastructure projects are either
in the planning or construction stage in Greecez2. These include: airports, bridges,
subways, railways, ports, highways, tunnels, canals, electric power, water supply, natural
gas, mining, telecommunications, hospitals, waste management, and tourism. Such a
massive effort to upgrade the infrastructure is the result of an understanding by the
politicians of the importance of strong infrastructure to the economy and pressures (along
with funding) from the European Union.
20 "Project Finance: A special report prepared by Commercial Bank of Greece." Euromoney. Sept. 1996.
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The infrastructure projects planned are valued at over DRX 23 8.3 trillion (approx.
$30 billion).2 4 Expected amounts contributed by each of the available sources is seen in
Figure 3.1.
Source Amount (DRX) Amount (ECU) Amount ($) Percentage
Greek Public Budget 1,994 billion 6.84 billion 7.39 billion 3.7i/o
European Union 3,942 billion 13.51 billion 14.6 billion 47-1%
Private Funds 2,445 billion 8.38 billion 9.06 billion 292%
Total 8,381 billion 29.73 billion 31.04 billion 10 %
Figure 3.1. Contributions to Infrastructure by Source.25
The lack of funds from the Greek Budget is evident. The importance of EU funds
for these projects is unquestionable. However, there is still a big gap between the project
costs and the public (both Greek and EU) money available. This gap is hoped to be filled
by the benefits of the alternate delivery methods and the use of private funds&
Major Projects
Egnatia and PATHE Highways
Considered one of the "Essen 14 priority projects" (chosen by the European Union
as key for the implementation of the trans European Network (TEN)), PATHE is the
north south axis which will link the port city of Patras to Athens to Thessaloniki and
finally the border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia26 . PATHE includes
23 Exchange rate in 1997 between the Greek Drachmae (DRX) and the US dollar averagdI approximately
$1=DRX270, and between Greek Drachmae and the European ECU approximately ECUl=DRX292.
These figures were used consistently throughout the thesis.
24 
"The Construction Industry Contributes 7% of GDP and 6.3% of Employment." EXPRESS, April
1997.
2 "The Construction Industry Contributes 7% of GDP and 6.3% of Employment." EXPRESS, April
1997.
26 European Commission. The Trans-European Network: Transforming a patchwork into a network.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission, 1995
the Rion-Antirion bridge, the Maliakos bay fixed link, and the Athens External Ring
connecting to the new Airport. The bridge and the External Ring (also known as Attiki
Odos) have already been tendered as BOT. While there is still talk concerning the
Maliakos bay link, it most likely will also be delivered under a BOT scheme. The highway
will be mostly upgrades along the existing 860 km distance. Total cost for PATHE is
ECU 3880 million.
Egnatia Highway is the east-west axis which will link Igoumenitsa, Thessaloniki,
and Alexandroupolis with the Bulgarian and Turkish border. The project involves the
construction of 797 km of new motorways. Total cost is estimated at ECU 2500 million.
These two projects are crucial to the transport infrastructure of Greece. The
results will be the significant reduction in travel time between important Greek cities, and
the considerable improvement in road safety.
Rion-Antirion Bridge
The link is a 2.5 km cablestay bridge across the western mouth of the Gulf of
Corinth connecting the Peloponesse to Central Greece. The agreement is for a BOT
arrangement and was signed in January of 1996. Total costs are estimated at DRX 210
billion. Breakdown from the various sources is as follows: State funds - DRX 92 billion,
Equity capital - DRX 14 billion, and Loans (EIB and others) DRX 104 billion. The
concession company is a consortium of eight companies led by GTM International and
GTP BTP.
27 "Project Finance", Euromoney: The 1996 Guide to Greek Financial Markets Supplement Sept. 1996.
p.21
Thessaloniki Metro
Thessaloniki is the second largest city in Greece, and also the capital of the
Macedonia region in the north28 . The project is the construction of a subway system
underneath the city which would contribute to improvements in the city's traffic
conditions. The project will be delivered using a BOT system, without any government
equity. Total cost for the project is estimated at DRX 400 billion. The project company is
called Makedoniko Metro, with the Greek contractor Michaniki controlling the biggest
share followed by Edistra SpA, AEG AG, Fidel SpA, and Tecnocenter Srl. It is estimated
that the construction will take five years. The benefits which the city of Thessaloniki is
expected to realize are similar to those of Athens (less traffic, less pollution, a better
standard of living).
Maliakos Bay Link
The link in Central Greece will be a tunnel under the Maliakos Bav. The tunnel
will be 4.5 km long, and would reduce travel time between Athens and Thessaloniki by an
additional 40 minutes. Total cost for the project is 100 billion DRX (preliminary
estimates). Most likely it will be given out as BOT. The Consortium will repay the
expenses through the collection of toll revenues.
:8 "Project Finance", Euromoney: The 1996 Guide to Greek Financial Markets Supplement, Sept. 1996.
p.21
9 "Project Finance", Euromoney: The 1996 Guide to Greek Financial Markets Supplement, Sept. 1996.
p.2 1
Natural Gas
The project involves the introduction of a new source of energy to the country, by
diversifying away from petroleum as the primary energy source30 . The project involves
bringing Russian and Algerian natural gas into Greece. The main pipeline is almost
completely constructed. Russian gas will be carried by a 510 km pipeline from the
Bulgarian border to the Athens area. The Algerian gas will arrive via tankers to a
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal near Athens. Total cost is ECU 1500 not including
the distribution network. The project is DBB, financed mostly from European and Greek
sources. The distribution network will have private financing and will be considered
DBO.
Summary of Projects
DBB
* Egnatia Highway
* PATHE Highway
* Gas Pipeline Between Bulgaria and
Greece
DB
* Preveza-Aktion Tunnel
* Athens Metro
Segmented
III
Fig. 3.2. Projects in Matrix Form
birect
CombinedAthens Airport
BOT
* Attiki Odos Highway
* Rion-Antirion Bridge
* Thesalloniki Metro
Indirect
30 "Works are Happening Despite the Elections", To Vima, Sept. 15, 996
DBO
* Several Power Plants
* Natural Gas Distribution
For such a large "basket" of projects taking advantage of all the types of delivery
methods (see figure 3.2) can and has done wonders. The results are as follows:
* Most of the 75 major projects have been planned for completion by the year 2000.
* Because of the volume of work, there are currently 30 construction companies
listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (up from just 2 in 1990). This ultimately
means that a lot of new jobs have, and are being created.
* The infrastructure developments and improvements will allow Greece to become
"the south European junction for air, road and ship transport of people and cargo,
both to and from, eastern and western Europe."' 1
Of course, the various delivery methods above are not enough. Many of the above
projects are part of the Trans-European Network (TEN), and so, the Community is
making great efforts to help the Greek government in developing these projects. This aid
is usually in the form of large sums of financing for projects which cannot be privatized.
Also, privatization policies have been implemented due to pressures from the European
Union for those projects which can be delivered in the private sector. It is very important
for the success of the infrastructure projects that the two major political parties in Greece
(both the government and the opposition) support the effort to modernize Greece's
infrastructure, and that they have placed infrastructure development as priorities in their
agendas.
3 "Greece: a Blue Print for Investment", ELKE: Hellenic Center for Investment, 1997
One of the biggest benefits of the use of private funds is that projects are no longer
put on hold until public funds are raised. Projects which are possible to deliver using
private funds (usually profit making projects) can be delivered immediately.
It is interesting to note how the Greek government is becoming more confident in
the use of BOT. Comparing similar projects of different planning time periods such as the
Preveza-Aktion tunnel with the Maliakos tunnel, and the Athens Metro with the
Thessaloniki Metro, a shift from DBB/DB to BOT can be seen.
Decision of the Greek State - The Airport Projects
The Airport Projects are not just one project. They are all the projects which
relate to the new airport. The government has chosen to package them as three separate
projects:
1.The new airport;
2.The new highway;
3.The development of the surrounding area;
The airport
For the construction and operation of the new Airport, the government, in a
partnership with the private sector, has set up a new company called Athens International
Airport. This company, operating in the private sector, has primary shareholders the
Greek State and a consortium led by the German contractor Hochtief AG. Its mission is
to finance, construct, operate and maintain the new Athens International Airport for thirty
years. It is responsible for delivering all the projects32 which relate to the operations of the
Airport within a closed area referred to as the "Restricted Development Zone." The
Airport Company is not permitted to perform any operations outside of this area.
Also, all of its operations are expected to be related directly with the business of
managing the Airport. Any infrastructure development which is needed outside of the area
will be provided to the Airport company by the Greek state. Such infrastructure would
include road access, potential rail-link, and utilities. (As agreed upon in the Development
Agreement.)
The new Highway
A new peripheral highway has been planned to serve the greater Athens Area since
the early 1950's.33 The name of the highway is Attiki Odos34, and a lot has changed from
the original plan, including the addition of a segment leading into the new Athens
International Airport. The total length of the highway is 72km. Approximately 15 km of
the highway will be the only direct Airport-Athens link- The majority of the traffic on this
portion of the roadway will be airport traffic.
The path of the roadway will surround the city linking the areas of Eleusis,
Stavros, and Spata. The Stavros-Spata is the section which will carry the bulk of the
Airport traffic. The road will be a six lane highway with room in the median for a
potential rail link (to be planned in the future should the Airport require it).
'3 See chapter 5 for a list and costs of all the projects.
33 "The Bulldozers in Attiki Odos", To Vima, Aug. 6, 1997
34 Attiki is the name of the county in which Athens is located. Odos is the Greek name for road.
Tolls are proposed to be set at DRX500 (US$2), payable at entry and exit points.
It is expected that in its first year of operation it will absorb 6% of the Athens traffic.35
This will result in time savings for drivers and reduction of pollution levels.
Attiki Odos will be delivered using a BOT scheme. For the delivery of this project
three companies have been established ((1)Attiki Odos,(2) Joint Venture company of 14
Greek construction companies, and (3) a company owned by the French Transroute).
Attiki Odos arranges the financing. Owners of Attiki Odos are the Greek Joint Venture
(owning 93%) and Transroute. The Joint Venture of construction companies also has a
contractual arrangement with Attiki Odos to build the project, while Transroute's Greek
company has an operation and maintenance contract. Total cost is estimated at US $1850
million. The breakup is $135 million from the consortium, EU grants totaling $210
million, a loan from the EIB for $675 million, other loans (from commercial banks) for
$100 million and the remainder from the State budget.
The Surrounding Area
In the 50's and 60's, downtown Athens saw a great real estate boom. 36 The next
two decades, the northern and southern suburbs enjoyed an even greater prosperity. Real
estate agents predict that for the next few decades it will be the Spata area which will see
major real estate development.37
3'5 The Bulldozers in Attiki Odos", To Vima, Aug. 6, 1997
6 For sake of argument, the term "project" is used to describe the Surrounding Area. It is not one project;
rather it is a lot of private and public land. The term "development of the Surrounding Area" is the one
which is described as a "project" onto itself. I chose to use the word "project" so as to make it comparable
to the other two.
3 "Stagnant Prices at Spata", To Vima, Oct. 13, 1996
The site where the new airport will be built lacks any "serious" development.
Currently, it is mostly farm land with some small villages several kilometers away.
Because of the introduction of the new airport and highway, along with the availability of
large parcels of land, a lot of commercial activity is expected to spring up. Activities such
as convention centers and hotels are certain to emerge, however, other businesses may
also choose to move to this new area as is usually the case with airports and highways.
Real estate brokers also believe that new residential areas will develop.
In 1992 a study was made to see what should be done with the area. However,
neither the Central Government nor the municipalities have taken any actions to ease the
development of this land. As of yet there has been no action in zoning the area so as to
permit structured (and legal"3 ) development. Because of this there has not been the
expected early movement around the real estate market in the area.39
Neither the Airport Company nor Attiki Odos have any presence in the
development of the surrounding lands. Nor do they have the right to operate outside of
their stated purposes. An "innovative" approach to either of the concessions would have
been to tie in the development of the surrounding area. By giving the land for
development to the private entities, it would have ensured prompt development (since they
would link it to their profitability).
38 In Greece, it takes a long time for the public administrations to place an area within a "Development
Zone", and so many times a lot of businesses and residents build without getting all the necessary permits.
A building which has been constructed without all the necessary permits cannot gain access to all the
necessary utilities. Also, if an area is outside of a Developed Zone, key infrastructure (including
telephone, potable water, sewer and local roadways) is not available.
39 "Stagnant Prices at Spata", To Vima, Oct. 13, 1996
Instead, the government has not touched the properties. It is letting the market
develop itself, without having passed any zoning laws for the area. The area remains idle.
Conclusions
As already mentioned, the Greek State chose not to give out one massive
concession for all three projects at the Airport. At the same time it did not give many tiny
concessions. 4" Rather, it chose to split it up into three large parcels: anything directly
related to the airport within the Restricted Development Zone went to AIA, the Highway
became part of Attiki Odos, and the development of the Surrounding Area remains in the
control of the public sector which has elected not to take any action yet.
In the Airport Development Agreement 41, the government guarantees to AIA that
a four lane highway will be constructed between Stavros and the Airport prior to airport
opening, and between Athens and Stavros prior to twelve months after airport opening.
Should the Stavros-Airport portion not be in operation, the government will pay the
Airport Company the sum of 35,000ECU for each day (to cover lost profit) and also all
the expenses of operations and maintenance. If the Athens-Stavros section is not
complete 12 months after airport operation, and the Airport Company demonstrates that
passenger traffic is not as projected in the agreement, the government will pay 25,000
ECU per day for loss of profit. These sums of money will be paid until the highway
opens. Significant construction of the highway has not yet begun even though the Airport
40 Examples of "many tiny concessions" would be the government tendering portions of the Highway,
rather than the entire Highway, or tendering directly the fuel farm or the Cargo facility rather than the
entire Airport.
41 Article 23.1 Airport Development Agreement
will be completed in 4 years. Many question whether or not the government will have the
highway completed in time so as not to pay any liquidated damages.
In order for the government not to have to take up risks of liquidated damages
resulting from the highway it could have packaged the airport contract in such a way so as
to include the construction of these portions of the highway. Delay risks would thus be
transferred to AIA.
One rational explanation as to why this was not done is that traffic studies have
shown that the section of the toll highway leading into the Airport would be the most
profitable, and so Attiki Odos may not have been as attractive to the private sector.
Therefore, in order to get private financing for the entire project, they chose to include in
the road package a money making section. The government then retains the risk of
liquidated damages, yet it does not have to contribute financially to Attiki Odos. The
compromise is potential costs vs. certain capital investments. It is likely that the
government will pass the liquidated damages over to Attiki Odos. However, as of yet all
the contracts are not completed.
A more nationalistic explanation would be that this project is small enough that a
Greek company could play a role as an equity partner in the concession (in fact fourteen
Greek companies are members of the consortium). No Greek Construction company has
the capabilities to compete against foreign companies in a concession for a project the size
of the Airport, however, they are able to compete in the highway project.
A similar explanation may be given for the development of the Spata region. The
government is not willing to give out more than is required to the concessionaires. An
explanation for this may be that they are not willing to "sell out" the entire Spata region to
the "foreigners!" This is a sentiment which has been expressed by several Greek
politicians, and their constituents concerning the privatization of key infrastructure. As
mentioned earlier the development of part of the land was included in the original RFP.
The socialist government however felt that it was giving Hochtief too much- At the same
time, a structured development plan has not been made for the area and so this site might
not be developed "properly."
Hopefully the packages which the government chose to bundle were based on
careful planning on its part rather than random choices. My view is that the Airport and
the Highway were justifiably separated. Unfortunately though, there was poor planning in
the Attiki Odos contract and so it has been inflicted by many initial delays. It is hopeful
that they will be overcome promptly and the project will be placed back on track so as to
avoid the hefty liquidated damages. However, since the government has not taken any
action which would ensure "proper" development of the area, the land development
should have either been passed on to the Airport company or the road company (as they
both have financial interests in its development).
It is very often the case in Greece that zoning rules come in effect after a lot of
construction has already taken place in an area. Because of this, there is no planning of
the area in terms of roadways and utilities, and at the same time many businesses cannot
function legally since licenses for operation cannot be given to their facilities.
CHAPTER 4: The Airport Company
Airport Ownership Models - World Wide
The worldwide model for ownership of large airports until the late 1980's had
been pubic ownership. However, by that time, the airports had "grown to a point where
they were large generators of revenues and profit, and also required significant
investments for capital improvements. ' '2  Moves were made in many countries to
"privatize '43 their nation's airports. The United Kingdom took the lead in this privatization
effort by passing the Airports Act in 1986 which required that all medium and large size
airports become private companies. BAA plc which was formerly known as the British
Airports Authority became the first airport company to be quoted on the British stock
exchange.
The form of public ownership varies from country to country. The following is a
brief list of the type of ownership structures which exist internationally for the ownership
of airports.
1.Ownership by a governmental agency or department. Airports are centrally
owned and operated. Examples of this type of ownership would include most developing
countries, as well as Canada, Sweden, Spain, Japan, Belgium, as well as the existing
airports in Greece.
42 Ashford, Norman and Wright, Paul H. Airport Engineering 3rd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1992: p. 9
43 "Privatize" is used as a general term which includes both the denationalization of an existing facility or
the use of a BOT type of project for the delivery of a new facility.
2.Quasi-governmental organizations which are set up by the government for the
purpose of airport ownership and operations.
3. Authorities for individual airports or for a group of airports authorized by
the government. The list of countries practicing this type of ownership structure includes:
France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States.
4.Private organizations. Ownership and operation of a nation's airport is in the
hands of the private sector. The level of risk which the private operator must face may
range from full acceptance to a sharing with the public sector. In the United Kingdom all
the Airports are owned by the private sector.
The Athens Case
Athens International Airport (AIA), is a corporation which was formed in order to
design, finance, construct, maintain and operate the new Airport for a period of 30 years.
The scope of work includes all projects which are located within airport grounds, except
those which relate to air navigation and traffic control which will be delivered by the
government through the CAA.44
The Airport Company has been formed by an agreement between the Greek
Government and a Consortium of German firms. The Airport Development Agreement
(ADA) defines the roles and responsibilities of all parties concerned for the next 30 years.
44 The CAA is the Greek Civil Aviation Authority which is similar to the American FAA
One of the clauses in the Agreement requires the Government to shut down the existing
Airport as soon as the new one is operational.
AIA is operating according to regulations which affect private companies - these
regulation concern staffing, management structure and profit motivations. It is a
partnership of equity ownership between the Greek State and the private sector. The
distribution of the share capital is seen in Figure 4.1. The amount of equity funds which
are invested by the private sector total 40 billion DRX with an additional 13 billion DRX
in subordinate debt. The total 53 billion DRX investment ($190 million) is approximately
8% of the total project cost of 658 billion DRX.45
Greek State 55%
Hochtief AG 36.125%
ABB Calor Emag Schaltanlagen AG 5%
Krantz T.K.T. GmbH 3.75%
Flughafen Athen Spata Projektgesellschaft mbH 0.125%
Fig. 4.1. Equity Distribution
The government's role is to issue the license to operate the airport, provide the
land and part of the funding, guarantee the EIB loans and the EU grants, provide the road
access, and also provide the CAA services. In terms of regulation, the government would
regulate the airside charges and guarantee an open skies policy.
The company is governed by a Board of Directors which consists of nine members.
Four are nominated by the Greek State and four by the other shareholders. The ninth
director is selected by agreement between the Greek State and the private shareholders.
The Chief Executive is proposed by Hochtief AG as the holder of the majority of the
consortium shares.
45 Athens International Airport, Athens Airport "Eleftherios Venizelos" Facts and Figures, 1996.
The Private Shareholders
Hochtief AG
HOCHTIEF is one of Europe's largest construction groups. The group's activities
focus on design and planning, construction, project management, general and turnkey
contracting. The group has extended its range of experiences internationally in the fields
of property development, finance agreements and facility management for building civil
engineering contracts.
ABB CALOR EMAG SCHALTANLAGEN AG
ABB Calor Emag Schaltanlagen AG, Ratinger, a wholly owned subsidiary of
ASEA BROWN BOVERI AG, Manheim, develops, manufactures, markets and services
turnkey substations and associated products. At its Sales and Engineering Center in
Manheim it is also active as a general contractor for complete electrical and mechanical
systems in facilities such as airports, sport complexes, large buildings and industrial
plants.47
KRANTZ-TKT GmbH
(DAG Group Balcke-Diirr AG)
KRANTZ-TKT with its main offices in Germany, is among the leading contractors
for mechanical services in Europe. The company's business activities traditionally focus
on the design, engineering and installation of mechanical services. Other key factors of
46 Athens International Airport. The Private Shareholders. 1996.
4' Athens International Airport. The Private Shareholders. 1996.
importance in the company's range of services are clean room technology, environmental
services and facility management.48
FLUGHAFEN ATHEN SPATA PROJEKTGESELLSCHAFT mbH
This company's founding member is the Frankfurt Airport Company, that is going
to be a consultant to the new international airport.49
Flughafen Frankfiurt/Main AG (FAG), the Frankfurt Airport Authority, is the
owner and operator of Frankfurt Airport. The shareholders of the company are the
Federal Republic of Germany, the State of Hesse and the City of Frankfurt. Although all
shares are publicly held, FAG is run like a private enterprise.
For the new Athens International Airport, Airconsult, the consulting group of
Frankfurt Airport, was responsible for the overall planning and design of the airport and
its facilities. Thus many concepts at the new Athens Airport resemble the Frankfurt
Airport. Airconsult will also give inputs in the structure of the new airport company and
will provide personnel for a transition period until shortly after the commissioning of the
airport.
A Public/Private Partnership
Public/private Partnership is a very general term. Usually it is a partnership
between private companies and some level of public government in order to provide a
service. The word partnership does not have its ordinary meaning here. The "partners"
are not jointly liable for the actions of the group nor for its individual members. Instead
48 Athens International Airport. The Private Shareholders. 1996.
49 Athens International Airport. The Private Shareholders. 1996.
the term partnership implies a certain level of cooperation between the two parties. There
are no set rules as to how such a "partnership" should be structured.
The Athens Airport has been called a public/private partnership. In fact, this is
spelled out in the Request for Proposals (RFP), where the successful consortium is
referred to as the "Government's Partner." How these partnerships are structured
depends on the individual project. Usually franchise agreements fit in quadrant I or I1I" of
Miller's Quadrants. The Airport Project has been characterized as BOT in the press,
although much of the funding for the project is direct, and the project more likely straddles
the line between Quadrant I and II.
The consortium currently owns 45% of the company while the government
retained 55%. In ownership therefore they are 45%-55% partners. Responsibility is more
difficult to quantify, and so a direct comparison cannot be made. However, if
responsibilities are understood, it is possible to evaluate how "fair" the distribution of
equity is.
The government's goal is to provide a necessary service (the Airport) to the
country. It concluded that the best way to provide this service is through a BOT type of
arrangement. 52 Structuring the BOT agreement properly is very important. Results in
history have ranged from cases where the contractors made money and the projects were
failures to cases where the projects were a success yet the developers went broke.
)0 Request For Proposals, Article 2
51 See Chapter 252 In the next chapter it will be shown how planners can chose from a portfolio of projects how to deliver
each project.
What the government has given to the Airport Company is no small token. They
are transferring the exclusive privilege to operate an international Airport. This Airport
will serve Athens (a city of five million people) and its surrounding area. Also, Greece
geographically is located between the Middle East and Europe. The level of service at the
new Airport is expected to be greatly improved over the existing one so that more transit
passengers will also choose to fly through Athens.
The Consortium would argue that they are making the Airport possible since they
are providing investments, arranging debt financing, and bringing in their expertise.
Ultimately, both sides are important to the Project.
The government decided on the selection criteria, and the terms of the agreement.
It requested proposals from the bidders for a plan of how they envisioned the Airport.
The selection was based on meeting the threshold technical requirements in their
proposals, the plan in general, and the level of cash investment provided. The technical
requirements were listed in the Request for Proposals. These included levels of service,
compliance with international and national codes and standards, passenger and cargo
capacity, runway capacity, and a lot of other technical requirements.
The government believed that indication of commitment is the best criteria for
evaluation of the proposal. Because of this, the final decision of award, was based on
what it saw as the measure of commitment, which is, the magnitude of the cash bid. Also,
the government did not accept unsolicited alterations to the technical requirements as
criteria for evaluation of the bids.53
The government's goal of the RFP and the selection process was to get the best
outcome possible. The selection criteria appeared to be fair and clear. It is based on the
belief that the Technical Requirements which the government has specified are the ones it
wants the proposals to be judged on. Also, award to the highest bidder appears to be a
fair judgment criteria, although it is questionable whether the 8% investment which the
winning consortium offered is enough of an indicator of commitment. Especially when the
consortium gets back its investment through the construction contract which its partners
hold and so does not rely on long term payback.
It is good that the government set firm standards and did not accept unsolicited
proposals. Unsolicited proposals are difficult if not impossible to compare and they do not
give the transparency which is required in public contracts. By not setting minimum bid
levels or some sort of tie with future cash flows, the government may not have received
the levels of guarantees or commitments which it was seeking.
The Airport is described as a project of highest priority to the Greek government.
This however does not mean that the government should have been foolish, and either
given too much to the developers or have been rushed into a poorly structured deal. A
"proper" deal would be one which gives the proper amount of guarantees, incentives, and
returns so as to satisfy the promoter and the developer.
53 Request For Proposals - Article 2.1.2 Selection Criteria
To demonstrate commitment to the project, the government guaranteed the
following: 54
* The State will pursue a policy which maximizes the level of air service to and from
Greece (Open Skies policy).
* A competing airport will not be built in Greece provided that the annual passenger
traffic at the new airport does not exceed the 50 million (fully developed) design
capacity.
* Road Access will be available prior to airport opening, as well as other
infrastructure such as utilities capable of handling the airport needs.
* The airport company will have freedom to set its own rates (within certain limits
regulated as not to restrict access to Greece).
* The Airport Company will enjoy special tax treatment.
* The existing airport will be closed as soon as the new airport is operational. The
government will not hold the Airport Company liable for any costs of closing the
existing airport.
* The government will not impose on the Airport Company any restrictions
regarding the remittance of profits nor regarding the Airport Company's
denomination of accounts in currencies other than the Greek Drachmae.
54 Request For Proposals - article 5.1.1 Government Responsibilities
* The Greek State will do its best in securing loans for the airport. This would
include guarantees of these loans equal to the lower of 40% of development costs
for the project or 3 times the cash bid.
* The Greek State will not contribute funds from its own budget, rather all state
grants will come from the Airport Development Fund (ADF). All departing
passengers from Greek Airports pay a departure tax which has been in place since
1992. This tax is placed into the Airport Development Fund.
On the other hand, the government will monitor the Airport Company extensively
to see that they are running an efficient and financially profitable Airport. The government
reserves the right to terminate the agreement if it can prove that certain agreements have
not been met.
It is interesting to note that the original RFP called for a longer lease period and
percentage of ownership in the project yet the consortium had contributed the same
amount of cash. The administration that time may have rushed into making a decision.
If the terms of the guarantees of the Greek government towards the Airport
Company are not met, the government will have to pay for all the extra costs which are
incurred by AIA due to each breach."
5 Airport Development Agreement, Article 23.7
Challenges
There are several challenges which the Airport Company faces, or will face, as it
manages the biggest infrastructure project in Greece. These can be summarized as either
external or internal. Some examples of each follow:
External
The biggest concern which AIA has is to satisfy a large number of stakeholders,
with partly conflicting goals. The public side wants a new, modem and efficient Airport
which will upgrade Greece's infrastructure. The government wants this Airport quickly
since it is important to the national economy. The private investors are mainly involved
with the construction of the Airport. As shareholders in the Airport Company, they want
a quick recovery of their investment so that they can move on to other projects.
Because the project is a public/private partnership, the decision making process is
complicated because of many agreements, laws, and understandings. There is the
Development Agreement between the Airport Company and the government, there is the
ICC between AIA and the consortium, there is Parliamentary laws which permit these sort
of projects under certain conditions, then there is the agreement between the Government
and the European Union which forces Greece into a public private partnership.
Furthermore, the EIB, as senior debt holder, has its own conditions which must be met.
All these groups have placed deadlines and conditions on AIA which need to be met
before continuing on to the next phase.
The size and type of project makes both the company and the project of highest
public exposure. Because of this AIA tries to control what information is released, and to
make certain that there is an understanding as to the way it operates.
Another key external concern is the role of Olympic Airways. Olympic Airways,
as the key airline company of Greece, is an important business partner to AIA. It is
estimated that 40% of the traffic forecasted for the new Airport will be from Olympic.
However, Olympic is suffering major financial problems, and it is doubtful whether it will
be able to finance and build its own facilities at the new airport. Of greater concern is
whether it will survive in the future. The Greek government has made no commitments or
promises of any passenger volumes including those from Olympic.
There may also be concern as to the role of the current Airport Administration.
AIA's business is currently being performed by other public entities such as the current
Airport Authority in Hellenikon and the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA). These
agencies have their own inefficiencies, and fear the loss of control, which may cause
instability in its transfer.
Internal
A major internal concern for AIA is the clash of different cultures. The company
consists of a mixture of Greek and German nationals. These parties are trying to work
together under local conditions. It is important for all parties to have an understanding of
how each other works and what the local conditions are like.
At the same time as AIA is managing the construction of the Airport it must
prepare for operation. It is important that while trying to control the construction it does
not overlook the operation (or the reverse). It should give equal emphasis to both parts
and not try to separate the two. The reason should be that design directly influences
operations and maintenance costs and efficiency.
Financing
The total project is expected to cost DRX 658 billion. The sources and
contributions to this project cost 56 are seen in Figure 4.2.
Share Capital (payable by consortium) DRX 40 billion
Secondary debt (payable by consortium) DRX 13 billion
European Union grants DRX 73 billion
Greek State grants DRX 44 billion
European Investment Bank loan (Greek State guarantee) DRX 312 billion
Commercial Bank loan DRX 98 billion
Airport Development Fund DRX 78 billion
Fig. 4.2. Sources of capital
It is worthy to note that the loan from the European Investment Bank is the largest
single loan ever given out by the European Investment Bank. The rate of the EIB loan is
set at 15 basis points above its cost of capital fixed at the time of each drawdown. 7
Currently it is set at 8.3%.
Of the DRX 658 billion costs, only the DRX 520 billion is for "capital
expenditure". The remaining funds are for operating expenses, interest during
construction, reserve funds, and the like.5'
56 This "project cost" is not lifecycle cost. It is the cost of initial design, construction- finance and
operation and maintenance during construction.
5' Airport Development Agreement, Schedule 22
5 Goldman Sachs International, Base Case for the Athens International Airport at Spata, January 1996.
Also, of the DRX 520 billion capital investment, 60% of the funds go to "direct
construction costs". The remaining 40% are defined as "indirect costs." These "indirect
costs" are to cover expenses such as design, construction management services, and
contingencies. With design costs for these projects ranging at approximately 15% and the
other items approximately the same, the 40% figure does not sum up. It is widely believed
that this 40% is a high number and the consortium was able to secure it because of strong
political influence.
The Consortium's dual role
The consortium which owns 45% of the Airport Company, is also the group which
holds the construction contract. Therefore, a dual role can be seen. They are both part
owner and contractor. Many believe that this sort of contract would bring added
efficiency to the project since the contractor would see the project as something long term
rather than short term. However, if the contractor is able to separate the construction
cash flows from the operation phase this efficiency may not be realized.
It is important that the Government and the Consortium agree to an Airport
Company which will prevent the separation of Construction and Operation- This is done
by requiring a financial investment from the Consortium to the Airport Company, by
preventing (for a certain period of time) the transfer of the Consortium's shares without
governmental approval, and restricting the payment of dividends for a certain period of
time.59
59 Airport Development Agreement Article 37
CHAPTER 5: Building the Airport
The "Basket"
It has been mentioned in several parts of this study that the Airport is a collection
of many smaller projects. All these smaller projects are dependent on each other so that
the airport will function properly. The projects which I have chosen to break up the
Airport into are the following:
1. Terminal building
2. Satellite terminal building
3. Police building
4. Building and Ground Maintenance Facility
5. Mobile Equipment Work Station
6. Catering Facility
7. IKA Clinic
8. Ramp Service
9. Sewage plant
10. Cargo Facility
11. Air Mail building
12. Veterinary building
13. Forwarders Building
14. Control tower
15. Fire/Rescue station
16. Hotel
17. Fuel Farm
18. Two Runways
19. Taxiways/Apron
20. Miscellaneous Roadways
21. Employee parking
22. Passenger parking
23. Earthworks
24. Aircraft bridges
25. Airfield light system and Power Station
26. Convention Center
27. Home Base facility - Olympic Airways headquarters
As mentioned in Chapter IV, AIA is responsible for the delivery of the entire
basket according to the Development Agreement. The government has transferred
"ownership" of all the projects to AIA, who in turn may transfer the responsibility of
delivery to another party.
The role which AIA has can be compared to that of a General Contractor. A
General Contractor signs a contract with the promoter to deliver a facility at a certain cost
within a set time frame. The General Contractor then transfers pieces of the construction
work to various trade subcontractors. When AIA acts in a manner similar to a General
Contractor, it signs a contract which may not only include construction responsibilities but
also design, financing, operation and maintenance.
For the airport company to deliver this entire basket, using conventional delivery
systems, the cost would exceed 730 billion DRX (See Appendix I). As will be seen later,
from all the available sources, AIA only has 520 billion DRX. To cover this 210 billion
DRX shortfall, AIA is attempting to apply alternate delivery methods, in particular BOT,
to some of the projects in the basket.
The Theory
The Airport Company must consider the following four items:
1.Maximize Returns to its investors including the Consortium and the Greek Government.
2.Limited Financial Resources
3.All projects must be completed
4.Tight schedule (Fasttrack Project)
The AIA is a company which is expected to function in the private sector. It is
expected to bring financial returns to its stockholders. From corporate finance, it is
known that the wealth of a firm's stockholders is highest if the firm accepts every positive
net present value project. However, as is often the case, there are limited resources which
prevent the company from undertaking all such projects (capital rationing is hinted)6 .
Unfortunately though, unlike capital rationing, projects cannot be eliminated. By not
performing one project the greater Project fails. Alternate delivery methods is the
proposed solution to this problem. By choosing a different delivery method the sources of
cash flows to the project are altered and expanded (the magnitude depending on the
method and the terms) to the point where it can be completed.
Level of Investment Required by Owner for
Each Delivery Method
DBB DB BO DBO BOT
(1) (2)
Fig. 5.1. Investment Required by Promoter
60 Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C. Principles of Corporate Finance. 5th ed. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1996.
Figure 5.1 shows in concept, the relative investment required from the promoter
for different types of delivery methods. From the figure, DBB requires a lot of
investment. One of the explanations for the higher level of investment in DBB relative to
DB is because of the loss in time due to the sequential scheme. DBO requires significantly
less promoter investment than DBB/DB, however there is often some investment in the
form of subsidies or other form of guarantees. As seen in the figure, DBO(1) describes a
situation where there are a lot of guarantees or subsidies, while DBO(2) has fewer
guarantees or subsidies. BOT in its "purest" form requires close to no investment from
the promoter. As delivery methods vary, the relative investment of third party private
investors goes up as that of the promoter goes down.
The investment which is not made by the promoter in DBO or BOT projects must
be made by another group. Many times the promoter has a better credit rating and is thus
able to receive financing at a better rate. In other cases, such as in the United States, the
public sector is able to issue tax exempt debt which carries a smaller finance cost.
Of course, along with the lower level of investment by the promoter comes less
control over the project. This is true for all stages such as the design, construction and
operation of the project.
The other benefit of mixing delivery methods in such a way is that if a project is a
big financial, winner and it is given to the private sector, some of the "winnings" may be
"chewed" by the promoter by lumping in a "loser" (a project which cannot support itself).
By doing this the promoter essentially gets the needed 'loser" project for free.
It is important to note that projects should be matched with possible methods first.
Then, the budget, which the promoter is willing to allocate, should be assigned. By doing
it the other way around the project planner pre-selects the delivery method, and in a sense
discriminates against other methods.
Capital Budgeting
Investing directly
Increase in in all positive
Total NPV Balance Between all .....--..NPV projects
methods - Optimum
configuration
Total Capital Available
Total Capital Invested
Fig. 5.2. Capital Budgeting and Positive NPV projects
Figure 5.2 displays the capital budgeting problem. By investing in all positive net
present value projects, the firm maximizes its return. However, there are not enough
funds available to invest in all the projects. What must be found is the optimum portfolio
of investments which would allow the firm to maximize its present value without
exceeding the available capital.
For the case of the Airport, projects cannot be eliminated, since they are required
for the Airport to function properly, and also required by the development agreement
signed between the Airport Company and the Greek State. However, for those few
projects which are viable with more than one delivery method, cash flows from the
promoter can be significantly altered by using different delivery methods. By mixing
delivery methods, all the projects can be matched to delivery methods which comply with
the budgeted time and funds, and produce the best possible maximum return to the
company.
The Process
As already mentioned, by trying to deliver the entire basket using conventional
delivery systems, there is a shortfall of DRX 210 billion. What is being proposed in this
section is a way that the Airport Company can deliver the entire Basket by using alternate
delivery systems to overcome the shortfall in funds. Three combinations will be
demonstrated. In choosing which combination is "best" it is important to keep in mind
AIA's four objectives (mentioned earlier in this chapter).
A first step would be to try and eliminate delivery systems which are not
compatible with each of the projects. Choosing which delivery system is compatible with
what type of project was done by using a system of Drivers proposed by Gordon6 .
Drivers are sets of requirements or limitations which surround the project. They can be
61 American Society of Civil Engineers, "Journal of Construction Management", Choosing Appropriate
Construction Contracting Methods, Christopher M. Gordon, March 1994
restrictions to the project, the promoter, or the market. Examples of Drivers include,
fasttrack projects, flexibility of design requirements, financing, expertise, and so forth.
Gordon defined the generic drivers of projects and assigned them to delivery
methods. What is seen from the model is not the best method for each project but rather
which methods are not compatible with it. There are some differences in what Gordon
was looking at and what is required in this case. Gordon focused more around contracting
methods by looking through the construction phase and not the entire life-cycle of a
project. To make his method more compatible to what is being looked at, Design Build
Operate (DBO) had to be added. The distinction between DBO and BOT projects would
be defined by the amount of risk which the promoter would have to take up for the project
to become a viable delivery.
Each of the project's unique characteristics were examined, and it was run through
the model. After looking at each of the project's drivers the possible delivery methods for
each of the projects was found. The results are summarized in Figure 5.3. A key
alteration which was made to the model was not assigning funding to the project. Rather,
what was looked at was the capability of the project to finance itself. Because this is a
basket of projects rather than one project, it is important that we decide which projects to
finance after we compare them all with each other.
Delivery Options
Description DBB DB DBO BOT
Terminal Building x x x
Satellite x x x
Police Building x x
Building & Ground Maint. x x
Mobile Equipment WS x x
Catering x x x x
IKA Clinic x x
Ramp Service x x x x
Sewage Plant x x x x
Cargo Facility x x x x
Air Mail x x x x
Veterinary Building x x
Forwarders Building x x x x
Control Tower x x
Fire/Rescue Station x x
Hotel x x x x
Fuel Farm x x x x
Runways x x x x
Taxiways/Aprons x x x
Miscellaneous Roadways x x
Employee Parking (S) x x x x
Passenger Parking x x x x
Earthworks x x
Aircraft Bridge x x x x
Airfield Light Sys & P S x x x
Convention Center x x x x
Home Base x x x x
Figure 5.3.
From Figure 5.3 various type of delivery options can be seen for each project.
Available financing has not been taken into consideration yet. All projects are initially
assumed to be delivered in Quadrant IV6 2 . For example, the Terminal Building and
Satellite buildings cannot be delivered using DBB, because they are fasttrack projects.
The sequential characteristics of DBB eliminates it as a candidate for fasttrack projects.
Other projects which are required, yet do not bring revenues to the project cannot be
delivered (as currently configured) by a BOT method. A private developer would not be
62 See Chapter II
interested in a project which lacks profit generation. Several of these projects may be
delivered by AIA using DBO processes by assigning portions of its guaranteed revenue
streams to offset initial costs.
The next step would be to match funding with the project. Funding comes from
five principal sources: the European community, in terms of grants, Greek government
grants, loans from the EIB and other banks, and the consortium. Based on agreements
the funding will follow the schedule seen in Figure 5.4. (allowing some shifting from year
to year.)
Total 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Airport Development Fund 57,841 5,259 24,997 8,868 13,743 4,973
EU Grants: Unconditional 43,755 10,939 10,939 10,939 10,939
Conditional 72,925 18,231 18,231 18,231 18,231
Consortium Equity 39,380 19,690 19,690
Consortium Subordinate Debt 13,127 6,563 6,563
EIB Loan 312,119 32,962 36,463 72,050 111,429 59,215
Commercial Loan 97,568 19,514 44,225 19,514 11,002 3,314
TOTAL All Sources: 636,714 113,158 134,855 155,855 165,344 67,502
TOTAL Non-capital expenses: 116,748 41,729 18,755 18,755 18,755 18,755
Remaining for capex: 519,966 71,429 116,100 137,100 146,590 48,747
Fig. 5.4. Funding from each source by year.63
As mentioned, the Airport is a fasttrack project, and so the schedule is fairly tight
with very little float. The Project started in
complete by November 1, 2000 (See figure 5.5
July 1st of 1996 and is expected to be
end of chapter). Because of this, the time
when certain activities must be complete is crucial. Therefore, there is a further constraint
in matching the projects with the available funds at a specific time frame.
63 Airport Development Agreement. Schedules 13, 16, 22, 23
There are numerous possible combinations that AIA might consider in order to
deliver the basket. The key questions include: (1) For DBO projects, what is the risk that
AIA will be required to make up revenue shortfalls: and (2) for BOT projects, what is the
risk that unpredicted shortfalls in revenues prevent the delivery of key elements of the
project.
Figure 5.3 gives the available delivery options for each of the projects according
to the Gordon method, modified for this project. Figure 5.4 summarizes the contributions
available from each source for the duration of the construction period. Figure 5.3 shows
the possible delivery options for each project, however it considers each project
independent of each other and of the available funds. Figure 5.4 shows what funds are
available from AIA for the construction period (however it does not give any indication
of the type of distribution which should be made to each of the projects). For example,
looking at the Terminal Building, it could be delivered as DB, DBO or BOT. All three
are valid choices. However, which system should be chosen for each project will be
based on an analysis of all the projects simultaneously, thus successfully matching
appropriate combinations of DB, DBO, and BOT systems.
In a later section, the possible combinations of the delivery methods with each
project will be seen. What will be done there, is a matching of funds, projects, and
delivery method so as to come up with several realistic recommendations as to how the
entire Airport can be delivered. It is important to note that the best outcome overall will
not just pop out of the model. The goal of the model is not to replace the experience or
the know-how of Project Managers or specifically Airport Project Managers. Rather it is
to be used as an added tool for them in deciding how to deliver the portfolio which they
are asked to manage. Also, the model can serve as an understanding in how certain
decisions are made concerning project delivery.
Basic Assumptions
In looking at Transportation projects, it is impossible to make conclusive forecasts
of revenues and expenses. This is because there are so many factors which affect the
predictions, that at best, any prediction would only be an "educated guess". However, this
is the best one can do in trying to understand a project which he is considering to invest in.
The assumptions which will be made in this model will be presented and discussed below.
The entire financial analysis is presented in Appendices I, I, III, and IV.
The construction costs for the entire Airport Project are seen in Appendix I.
These are probably the most predictable expenses of the entire project. The requirements
of the facilities have been spelled out in the RFP and the Master Plan. Therefore using
traditional Construction Estimating, predictable costs can be made within reasonable
values. Also, many of the contracts, including the ICC (which is a Design Build
Guaranteed Maximum Price Contract) have already been signed, locking certain of the
major costs at fixed values.
Construction costs for the Airport Project have been released. However, actual
budgeted cost breakdowns are proprietary information since many subcontracts have not
yet been awarded and so they have not been released. To estimate the costs of individual
projects, typical unit prices for the area were used. This gave a reasonable breakdown of
the actual budget. The unit prices which were used were from Olympic Airways which
predicted a 20% degree of error in their units64.
Most of the cash flow projections are based on traffic volumes. Traffic
volumes are also the most unpredictable values of the entire forecast. They are linked to
factors such as general economic condition, tourism, political stability and perceptions of
personal safety.6 5 For the thesis, the traffic volumes are taken from the Master Plan.
According to the Master Plan, there are three main methods to forecast air traffic: trend
projection, econometric model, and market and industry survey6 6 . Because of the lack of
data available, the forecasters had to make assumptions and implement all three traffic
projection methods. Trend projection methods are good for short to medium term
projections since they are based on historical trends continuing into the future.
Econometric models tie the Gross Domestic Product and the price of air service to traffic
forecasts. The traffic projections used in this study are seen in Figure 5.6.
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Passenger Forecast 12,810,005 14,615,086 16,902,956 18,865,741 20,820,577 22,798,421
Air Traffic Movement (ATM) 134,885 148,398 166,185 180,870 197,012 210,388
Cargo Traffic (tons) 143,000 185,000 240,00 308,774 397,530 501,764
Figure 5.6. Traffic Projections67
The Greek government does not offer any guarantees to these projections except if
Attiki Odos is not operational at the time of Airport Opening. If the highway is not
operating at the time of Airport Opening, the government must pay the Airport Company
6Olympic Airways S.A. Move of Olympic Airways S.A. to the New Airport. April 1997
65 Coopers & Lybrand, Project Assumptions Update Athens International Airport, May 2, 1995
66 Master Plan, Article 2.2 Forecast Methods
67 Master Plan, Article 2.1 Traffic Forecasts
liquidated damages as described in Chapter 3. Therefore, under normal conditions, the
traffic risk lies with AIA.
As seen in Article 26 of the Airport Development Agreement, the Greek
Government promises the Airport Company funds from the Airport Development Fund
(ADF) until the year 2014. The ADF is a special fund which has been created by the
Greek State in order to finance developments in the Nation's Airports. It can be
considered as a cross subsidy for other airports. All revenues to the fund come from a
departure tax at the Airports, and does not affect the National Budget. The amount
which the Airport receives from the fund is linked to the number of passengers which go
through the Airport. For the model, current rates are assumed, which are 5ECU for
domestic and 10ECU for international departing passengers. Projections for the fund are
seen in Figure 5.7. During Construction, the government guarantees up to ECU45
million68 (13 billion DRX) from the ADF for construction purposes. Since during
operation the amount received from the fund is linked to traffic and it does not affect the
national budget, the ADF revenue risk lies with the Airport Company. On the other hand,
during construction, the amount received from the ADF comes from revenues collected at
other Airports. Since these government guaranteed funds are allocated to AIA, they
cannot be used by other airports (which are all publicly owned).
2001 2005 2010
Domestic 12,517,873 14,281,789 16,517,484
International 3,082,760 3,517,157 4,067,739
Total ADF (xl 0000RX) 15,600,633 17,798,946 20,585,223
Figure 5.7. Airport Development Fund
68 Airport Development Agreement, Article 26
The landing fees which will be levied are assumed to be 10ECU (2,917DRX) per
passenger. This is taken from the Business plan and it is 30% above the average of the
three highest charges levied at European airports in 1995. Because of the high cost of
financing the new Airport, a high landing fee is required. As a proportion of travel costs
the landing fees are very low and so it is unlikely that a high landing charge would impact
the traffic forecasts. Traditionally governments have set the level of Airport landing fees.
It is important to cover the risk associated with these fees, thus the government should be
willing to enforce them. 69
Some other revenues are seen in Figure 5.8, and Figure 5.9.70 The values in the
Figures are for the first year, however they have been projected in the Appendices for
subsequent years. It is important to note that these values take into consideration the
withdrawal of duty free allowances from passengers traveling within the EUI at the end of
1999. There is still some lobbying to keep these allowances in place.71 Therefore at best
the values are quite speculative. Also, this risk rests with the Airport Company as there
are no governmental guarantees. It can however transfer part of the risk over to other
parties if it chooses to deliver the projects associated with these revenues in alternate
systems.
69 Coopers & Lybrand, Project Assumptions Update Athens International Airport, May 1 1995
70 Business Plan
71 Coopers & Lybrand, Project Assumptions Update Athens International Airport, May 1 1995
Area Revenue Contribution at airport
Opening (millions er year)
ECU DRX
Departures
Duty Free 6.48 1890
Retail 6.50 1896
Lounges 2.30 671
Restaurants 2.28 663
Landside Areas 1.31 281
Total 18.87 5491
Figure 5.8: Targeted In Terminal Revenue
Item Revenue Contribution at airport
Opening (millions per year)
ECU DRX
Office Rental Z7 786
Other In-terminal space 2.1 611
Air activities, home base cargo 4.2 1222
terminals, airmail
Commercial development, office 2.8 815
park, hotel
Total 11.8 3434
Figure 5.9: Revenue Contributions from Property Development
Other sources of revenue include Aircraft Fueling, Aircraft Handling, and car
parking. Originally all of the risk of each of these projects is borne by the Airport
Company. However, depending on how it decides to deliver each of the projects, it can
alter the level of risk which it is exposed to.
There are two type of expenses which the Airport Company faces. These are the
"fixed" and the "variable" expenses. The fixed expenses include the Senior debt and the
grants of rights fees. Variable expenses are the contributions to reserve fund, Subordinate
Debt, Tax, and Operating Expenses. The variable expenses are all linked to the Operating
Revenues of the Airport Company.
According to Article 22 of the Airport Development Agreement, the Airport
company enjoys special tax status through the year 2015. For the analysis, all the
revenues are considered tax exempt through 2015. After that year a 35% tax rate is
assumed.
Risks of the expenses are shared between the Airport Company, its investors, and
the Greek Government. The Government has offered a guarantee to the primary Debt
Holder, the EIB, for the repayment of the loan if the Airport Company is not able to meet
its debt obligations. The investors have contributed equity and subordinate debt capital to
the Airport Company. The repayment of this depends on the cash flow of the project.
The Airport Company is expected to cover the operating expenses, the taxes, and the
grant of rights fees from its cash flows.
Possible Combinations
The first combination is seen in Figure 5.10. Most projects are delivered as either
DBB or DB. Catering, Cargo, Veterinary, Forwarders, Hotel, Parking Garage,
Convention Center, and Home Base are BOT deliveries. This configuration produces all
the non BOT projects within the fixed budget of 520.8 billion DRX for construction costs,
(along with proper timing) with an IRR to the Airport Company of 13.75% (See
Appendix II). This is the strategy which the Airport Company has chosen to go ahead with
and is referred to as the "Base Case." With this strategy, the Airport Company will
concentrate on maintaining and operating the basic infrastructure of the Airport. The
remainder of the facilities, which can be described as secondary, yet essential, would be
delivered as concessions which the Airport Company would oversee.
Under this strategy, the Airport Company is giving a lot of its potential revenues to
other business entities by only focusing on core activities. However, by concentrating
only on core activities it can gain the advantage of a focus strategy.72
A second choice, seen in Figure 5.11 and referred to as Alternate 1, would be for
the Airport Company to subsidize the construction costs of delivering the Home Base.
AIA would contribute 50% of the construction costs, thus taking a major financial burden
off Olympic Airways. This would bring the Homebase project into Quadrant I making it
DBO. However, because of the significant costs associated with the Homebase, AIA
would not have to seek other delivery options for some of its other projects to make up
for the cost of subsidizing the Homebase. In this Alternate it is proposed that it gives up
the Runways, and Taxiways, along with Catering, Cargo, Veterinary, Forwarders, Hotel,
Parking Garage, Fuel Farm, Ramp Service Equipment and Convention Center to BOT.
The IRR to AIA for this combination of delivery would be 12.28% (See Appendix m). In
this case, the Airport Company would essentially manage all the terminal operations of the
Airport. This would be an interesting choice since Olympic Airways has a lot of financial
problems, and many sources question its ability to provide for its own facilities. Therefore
what is being demonstrated in this case is how AIA can mitigate some of its financial risks
by subsidizing or aiding projects which cannot deliver themselves. However what must
be looked at is how the loss in returns compares to the decrease of risk.
Key to the financial returns of the Airport Company is the role of Olympic
Airways. Athens is expected to function as a "hub" airport for Greece, with Olympic as
72 Porter, Michael E., Competitive Advantage. New York: The Free Press, 1985.
its home carrier. Many of the traffic projections (which ultimately revenues are based on)
follow the "hub" assumption. Approximately 40% of the projected passengers will be
from Olympic. These passengers turn into revenues when one looks at landing fees,
concessions, and other items which bring income into the Airport Company. The revenues
from the Olympic passengers are split throughout the basket. Therefore, giving a boost to
Olympic may help the Airport Company in the long run.
This choice, assumes that the Runways are delivered under a BOT scheme. Such
a delivery was done recently in Colombia", where the concessionaire receives a portion of
the landing charges.
The third combination of delivery methods is seen in Figure 5.12 and is referred to
as Alternate 2. This case is similar to the base case, except that under this scheme, the
Airport company delivers the Ramp Services and the Cargo projects in Quadrant IV. To
fill in the gap it gives up the utilities such as the Sewage plant and the lighting system and
also the Aircraft Bridges to the private sector. This delivery raises the IRR to 15.6%.
What is being demonstrated in this case is a swap of a few projects, with similar costs
(AIA is giving passing over 23.4 billion DRX and paying 24.9 billion DRX). The result is
a gain in returns. In this case however, the Airport Company has to manage a more
diverse portfolio. The diversity is not in the number of projects (which remains essentially
unchanged), but rather in the type of projects. The cargo and the ramp services are
projects which are more complicated from a managerial standpoint than the utilities and
the aircraft bridges. Therefore they can also be considered to be more risky.
73 Juan, Ellis J. "Airport Infrastructure: The Emerging Role of the Private Sector", The World Bank,
Washington, D.C. 1995.
Looking at the three cases, and comparing the capital investments made in each
(see Appendices II-3, 111-2, and IV-2), they all appear to be within the same range (520 to
525 billion DRX). However, individually the expenditures are altered since the projects in
each portfolio are different. Observing these appendices (and also those which relate to
operating expenses and revenues) one may think that all projects which are put out in the
private sector are self supporting. This is not necessarily true. There are costs which the
promoter must consider relating to these projects (for example some initial planning),
however for simplicity they have not been included in the financial analysis.
To be able to compare these three schemes in a meaningful fashion, a sensitivity
analysis was performed. This was done by altering the variables described in Figure 5.13.
The results show how sensitive the IRR is to each change. Once the revised IRR was
found, it was taken as a percentage of the original IRR_ The percent change in IRR was
recorded in the figure. Looking at the figure, conclusions can be drawn as to what action
each combination is sensitive to. The base case is more sensitive compared to others in
changes in passenger volume, while alternate 2 is more sensitive to changes in Air Traffic
Movements. Alternate #1 generally did not react as much in shifts as Alternate #2 which
is the most volatile.
Passenger Volume -10% -8.92% -8.22% -10.61%
Passenger Volume +10% 12.61% 12.05% 11.7%
ATM Volume -10% -0.21% -0.33% -5.52%
ATM Volume +10% 0.28% 0.41% 5.45%
Cargo Volume -10% -0.28% -0.41% -0.97%/
Cargo Volume +10% 0.35% 0.49% 0.91%
Operating Revenue -10% -14.16% -16.37% -21.45%
Operating Revenue +10% 18.7% 22.96% 26.91%
Operating Cost -10% 7.15% 8.22% 15.03%
Operating Cost +10% -5.59% -6.84% -13.52%/
Fig. 5.13. Sensitivity Analysis.
From a managerial point of view, Alternate #2 is likely to have higher costs than
those predicted since the company is involved in diverse businesses. On the other hand
Alternate #1, being more focused, is likely to have lower costs. Because of the financial
problems which Olympic is going through, it is likely that traffic forecasts will be affected.
This would likely occur in the Base Case and in Alternate #2. Even if Olhmpic does not
close all its operations it is very likely that some routes will be canceled. This will
ultimately affect traffic. By giving Olympic the subsidy in construction some of the
revenue risk will be eliminated.
What is seen from this process is that projects are matched with delivery systems
using each project's characteristics, along with the funding available from other sources.
This gives the possible choices. Which choice is ultimately chosen depends on the strategy
which AIA chooses to follow for the entire package. From a managerial point of view one
can roughly predict what is likely to happen with each decision which AlA makes as it
relates to delivering the portfolio. From the sensitivity analysis, a quick check on where
the rate of return will go can be made.
The model which was examined in this chapter was created to demonstrate an
approach that an entity which is given a portfolio to manage can follow. The results
which are found in the financial analysis are quite speculative, and so hard conclusions as
to what AIA should do cannot be given. However, as a process, the approach which an
entity such as AIA should follow was demonstrated.
A further refinement of this process would be to repeat it from the beginning
assigning alternate projects. This would result in a different portfolio with different
financial returns. It would give a whole new set of possible options. As a theoretical
process, performing this analysis would not contribute any new insight. However, in
reality, this sort of analysis would be required in order to find the optimum combination of
deliveries.
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Figure 5.10. Base Case Delivery
Delivery Options
Description DBB DB DBO BOT
Terminal Building x
Satellite x
Police Building x x
Building & Ground Maint. x x
Mobile Equipment WS x x
Catering x
IKA Clinic x x
Ramp Service:
Building x x
Equipment x
Sewage Plant x x
Cargo Facility x x
Air Mail x x
Veterinary Building with Cargo
Forwarders Building x x
Control Tower x x
Fire/Rescue Station x x
Hotel x
Fuel Farm x
Runways x x
Taxiways/Aprons x x
Roadways x x
Employee Parking (S) x x
Passenger Parking x
Earthworks x x
Aircraft Bridge x x
Airfield Light Sys & P S x x
Convention Center x
Home Base x
Figure 5.11. Alternate #1
Delivery Options
Description DBB DB DBO BOT
Terminal Building x
Satellite x
Police Building x x
Building & Ground Maint. x x
Mobile Equipment WS x x
Catering x
IKA Clinic x x
Ramp Service:
Building x x
Equipment x
Sewage Plant x x
Cargo Facility x x
Air Mail x x
Veterinary Building with Cargo
Forwarders Building x x
Control Tower x x
Fire/Rescue Station x x
Hotel x
Fuel Farm x
Runways x
Taxiways/Aprons x
Roadways x x
Employee Parking (S) x x
Passenger Parking x
Earthworks x x
Aircraft Bridge x x
Airfield Light Sys & P S x x
Convention Center x
Home Base x
Figure 5.12. Alternate #2
Delivery Options
Description DBB DB DBO BOT
Terminal Building x
Satellite x
Police Building x x
Building & Ground Maint. x x
Mobile Equipment WS x x
Catering x
IKA Clinic x x
Ramp Service:
Building x x
Equipment x x
Sewage Plant x
Cargo Facility x x
Air Mail x x
Veterinary Building with Cargo x x
Forwarders Building x x
Control Tower x x
Fire/Rescue Station x x
Hotel x
Fuel Farm x
Runways x
Taxiways/Aprons x
Roadways x x
Employee Parking (S) x x
Passenger Parking x
Earthworks x x
Aircraft Bridge x
Airfield Light Sys & P S x
Convention Center x
Home Base x
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion
The Public Sector
One of the many roles of government is to encourage a higher standard of living
for its people. This is done through growth of the economy. Historically economic
growth and infrastructure has been positively correlated7 4 . It has been the government's
responsibility to provide the infrastructure needs of its community. The way that the
government delivers infrastructure is something which is in flux.
Today's communities have great demands in infrastructure. In many cases these
demands cost more than the public budget can handle. Government planners decide on
what is needed and how it should be delivered. They need not immediately eliminate
projects because public funds are not available. Rather they should look for other means
to finance and deliver these projects. Alternate project delivery methods can help. By
tapping into private markets, "new" money can be found by creating attractive alternative
investments for the public sector in infrastructure. Therefore, by alternative configurations
of its infrastructure portfolio, and by utilizing all the available delivery methods, the public
sector can assist more effectively in greater economic growth.
It is important to realize that each project delivery system has its own unique
advantages and disadvantages, and so one must understand which method is most
appropriate for each project. There is no set way of deciding which system is best for
which project, however careful planning does eliminate those methods which are not
74 Miller, John B. Aligning Infrastructure Development Strategy to Meet Current Public Needs. Doctoral
Thesis. Cambridge: MIT 1995.
suitable. A public planner should approach the problem of matching systems with projects
carefully, with an open-mind and should not discriminate on methods without justification.
The positive results for Greece have been demonstrated. Greece is a country with
a weak economy and a strong historic commitment to publicly delivered infrastructure.
By taking advantage of all the delivery methods available, it has been able to deliver most
of the projects in its portfolio. The choice for new infrastructure no longer has to be
either a new road, a subway system, a powerplant, or an airport. It can be all of them. At
the same time public funds are released to be used for other aspects of the government
budget.
The fact that the alternate delivery methods are available is not enough. It is one
thing to have the tool and another to know how to use it. It is not possible for the
government to pull out of the delivery process completely. Only the government knows
what infrastructure needs it requires and it is responsible for performing the initial
planning. This planning will attract private sector capital investment only if these projects
are organized and structured in a certain way. Part of this task is the duty to select which
projects to deliver with what method and also how to package the individual projects
together so as to ease their delivery.
Many BOT concessionaires are not operators. Rather they are construction
companies (as is the case in Athens). These companies see BOT as the only way for them
to get construction contracts. It is important that the government makes sure that when it
awards a BOT contract it does not only award a construction contract but a development
contract as well. The government must balance all aspects of the delivery to increase the
likelihood that it will get a good product.
The Private Sector
With the re-introduction of alternate delivery methods (such as DB, DBO and
BOT) for infrastructure in many countries, a new breed of companies has re-emerged.
These are the "project companies." Their duties are usually to design, construct, operate,
own, and finance projects. Their goal is to maximize the returns to the investors.
A megaproject can be looked at as a portfolio of smaller projects. As in the public
approach, diversifying the portfolio in the private sector by delivery method, permits more
projects to be completed. The added parameter which the private sector must face is that
it must bring competitive returns to its investors. By matching methods with projects
"carefully" and "properly", there are more vehicles available to maximize returns to the
investors.
One of the constraints which the Airport Company has, that the public side does
not, is the commitment to deliver all the projects within a portfolio. A government makes
promises, the private sector makes commitments. ALA has signed a contract to deliver the
entire Airport. For this Airport to work all the projects which have been discussed must
be delivered. By using the optimization technique ,which has been presented the Airport
Company is able to deliver the entire portfolio even though at first glance it does not seem
to have all the required funds.
The optimization technique gives a selection strategy based on possible delivery
methods and IRR. The company must still make the choice as to which strategy to follow
in terms of management, returns to investors, and risk which it is willing to accept. The
results of the optimization technique are not what the company should do, rather it gives
the company a choice of what it can do.
In setting up the model for this analysis the goal was to be as realistic as possible.
The Airport is a $2.1 billion project. In braking it up into separate smaller projects it was
important that these projects made sense. Instead of a basket of twenty seven projects, it
could have been a basket of one project or a basket of hundreds of projects. Therefore,
defining the boundary of a project was the first step. The goal was to name a piece of the
Airport a project if it could be looked at in subsequent steps as such. This would be in
terms of delivery and management.
The Athens Airport was used as a case study of alternate delivery systems. The
models which were built in Chapter 5 in order to demonstrate the use of alternate delivery
systems were chosen arbitrarily although it was important that they were reasonable
choices. There are hundreds of combinations which can be made. But understanding and
recognizing that the project must ultimately create an airport limits the possible choices.
One must keep in mind that for the model to work it should not only be theoretical but
also practical. The practicality is seen from whether or not the choices make sense from a
managerial point of view. This was the underlying perspective throughout the analysis.
The Analogy
Ultimately, the public and private sectors are analogous. Both are constrained by
budgets and responsibilities. Both can and should utilize the entire gamut of delivery
methods to achieve their goals. These goals are not necessarily the same.
The Greek situation is seen in Figure 6.1.
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Fig. 6.1.
A valid question could be "Why is a private Airport company needed in the first
place?" All the projects in the above chart which are attached to the Airport Company
could have been treated as the responsibilities of the Central Government. In Hong Kong
for example, the government, instead of giving out one giant contract, to the private
sector, kept the excavation and basic infrastructure support work to itself and awarded
several BOT franchises to complete the fuel, cargo, maintenance, and catering facilities.
The answer to the question most probably lies in transferring risk to those most suited to
handle it. Collectively the risk of managing all the individual airport projects was too
great for the Central Government, so it chose to transfer this risk over to a new entity
which arguably, is better equipped to manage it. AIA's strategy has included a further
allocation of this risk to second tier BOT projects and what amounts to a hedging strategy
implemented through the award of second tier DBO franchises. Also, in many countries
(including Greece) the private sector is much more productive than the public sector.
Therefore there is also the productivity gain of private delivery, coupled with not having
to manage so many activities in the public sector.
Comment about BOT
A legitimate question arises about BOT projects when there is a great deal of
Governmental intervention. In the Airport project, the government not only is a big equity
holder (55%), it also guarantees the loans of the project and the highway opening risk.
Because of this action, even though the project has been called a BOT, a substantial
argument can be made that AIA is really a DBO operator. However, the government has
not guaranteed air traffic or revenue streams so it appears that this risk remains with the
company. Yet, if the company is not able to pay the debt or becomes insolvent in the
future, because, for example Olympic Airways ceasing operations, the government is stuck
with the bill. Together with its 55% stake in AIA, the Greek government is directly
connected to the success or failure of the AIA franchise. Therefore, it can be argued that
the government indeed carries its share of the revenue risk. Issues like these are certain
to arise as Governments, companies and banks learn more about the peculiarities of
dealing with BOT projects.
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Appendix I-1-1
Total Capital Expenditure Required to Deliver the Entire Airport DBB/DB
Assumptions:
To build the Capital Expenditure table below several sources were used since the actual values were confidential.
The construction schedule was provided by AIA. The costs were based on unit prices which were provided
by Olympic Airways multiplied by the project descriptions found In the Master Plan. There was
some adjustment based on "engineering judgment" to the cost of each of the projects.
Spending per period was based on "judgment" and total expenses per period provided by AIA.
PROJECT YEAR
Name Aggregate Cost 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Indirect costs (40%) 208,130,000 81,191,298 13,451,208 27,036,302 44,783,996 41,667,196
Terminal Building 84,712.455 7,624,121 18,636,740 28,802,235 29,649,359
Satellite 19,887,539 1,789,879 4,375,259 6,761,763 6,960,639
Police Building 3,642,699 692,113 2,950,586
Building & Ground Maint. 7,072,771 4,809,484 2,263,287
Mobile Equipment WS 2,674,504 2,112,858 561,646
Catering 4,000,000 40,000 1,560,000 2,280,000 120,000
IKA Clinic 4,356,217 2,657,292 1,524,676 174,249
Ramp Service 2,741,413 740,182 2,001,231
Sewage Plant 8,264,436 7,768,570 495,866
Cargo Facility 6,632,450 66,325 2,387,682 3,913,146 265,298
Air Mail 2,365,877 1,040,986 1,324,891
Veterinary Building 480,000 110,400 369,600
Forwarders Building 681,600 231,744 449,856
Control Tower 24,277,608 2,184,985 5,341,074 8,254,387 8,497,163
Fire/Rescue Station 4,581,539 2,703,108 1,740,985 137,446
Hotel 21,470,400 214,704 6,441,120 13,096,944 1,717,632
Fuel Farm 10,550,000 1,266,000 9,178,500 105,500
Runways 14,780,779 5,173,273 7,833,813 1,773,693
Taxiways/Aprons 40,995,835 14,348,542 21,727,793 4,919,500
Misc. Roadways 5,489,239 93,317 1,756,556 1,838,895 1,619,326 181,145
Employee Parking (5) 981,815 225,817 755,998
Passenger Parking 733,500 168,705 564,795
BEathworks 69,992,766 2,099,783 14,698,481 29,396,962 23,797,540
Aircraft Bridge 5,0902,791 5,194,456 708,335
Airfield Light Sys & P S 9,256,169 2,776,851 5,090,893 1,388,425
Convention Center 50,000,000 500,000 15,000,000 30,500,000 4,000,000
Home Base 118,252,750 1,182,528 31,928,243 73,316,705 11,825,275
Total 732,907,152 94,983,383 86,658,939 213,317,176 273,560,752 64,386,930
x1000DRX
Appendix 11-1-1
Basic Assumptions
Traffic Volumes:
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Passenger Forecast 12,810,005 14,615,086 16,902,956 18,865,741 20,820,577 22,798,421
Air Traffic Movement (ATM) 134,885 148,398 166,165 180,870 197,012 210,388
Cargo Traffic (tons) 143,000 185,000 240,000 308,774 397,530 501,764
Source: Master Plan
In the Master Plan, Forecast for passengers is broken up for Transfer, International and Domestic/EU.
Transfer for the 30 year period accounts for up to 3% of the passenger forecast. For simplicity, It will be
assumed that 33% of the passengers are International while 67% are domestic/EU for the entire length
of the project. This assumption is slightly off from the one used by AIA in that the ratios are constant.
Exchange Rates:
Throughout the thesis and these calculations the following exchange rates will be used: (Ave. 1995 values)
DRX/DM: 160.1
DRX/ECU: 291.7
DRX/$: 280
Airport Development Fund:
The Airport Company will receive a special tax from the Greek Government of 5ECU per domestic
and 1OECU per international departing passenger until the year 2013. This is referred to as the Airport
Development Fund (ADF).
Assume 1/2 the passengers are departing:
2001 2005 2010
Domestic 6,258,936 7,140,894 8,258,742
International 6,165,519 7,034,314 8,135,477
Total ADF (x1000DRX) 12,424,456 14,175,208 16,394,219
Taxation:
The Airport Company is exempt from taxes until the year 2015, After 2015 assume tax rate Is 35%.
Appendix 11-2-1
Cashflow From Operations'
Operating Revenue (From 11-6-1)
Operating Costs (From 11-16-1)
Gross Operating Income
ADF Received (From 11-4-1 (Constr), I1-1-1 (Oper))
Grants of Rights Fee (From ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Available for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt (From 11-5-1)
Principal Payment (From 11-5-1)
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investment Cashflow:
Capital Expenditure (From 11-4-1)
Grants (From 11-4-1)
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Equity Capital (From 11-4-1)
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordinate Debt Drawdown
Senior Debt Capital (From 11-4-1)
EIB Loan Construction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt
Net Project Cash Flow:
Value of Cash Reserve
Remaining for Sub. Debt
Sub. Debt Required
Cummulative Sub Debt
Sub Debt Paid
Remaining For Dividends
lIgitlly I WU| It 0bi aesh r low it Cotnriitum
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium
x1000 DRX
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
53,374,325 63,406,171 69,709.316 76,664,000 84,400,381 91.797,398
(4,242,490) (4,830,857) (7,314,649) (10,860,704) (10,063,246) (21,349,730) (25,362,469) (27,883,726) (30,665,600) (33,760,153) (36,718,959)
.. 4,242A8) _A4..,0.8 7) (714,049) .J1010.7Z04) .i1QQ3.24@) . 2.Q24.5 _ .Q43203.1 41.825O8 45.9A9Q _.&4. _5,078439
10,499,879 13,554,341 15,909,622 13,087,634 12,516,369 12,424,456 12,880,454 13,298,838 13,730,291 14,175,208 14,594,190
(320) (320) (320) (320) (320) (295,224)
O A .__-,2-,3 7 ,14 __B,. 2.22.,91 2.453.123 44.44 1 _ 50.@23.83 5-12_4,10 59.7.2&7.1 64. 815-17- - 9.IZZAQ4
6,257.389 8,723,484 8,594,973 2,226,930 2,453,123 44,448,731 50,923,836 55,124,107 59,728,371 64,815,117 69,377,404
3,035,671 8,717,710 13,797,649 24,066,148 27,326,213 33,729,677 32,861,999 31,994,321 31,126,643 29.531,770 27.874,358
S- 10,542,869 10,542,869 10,542,869 18,998,626 19,725,821 20,515,555
3,035,671 6,717,710 13,797,649 24,066,148 27,326,213 44,272,546 43,404,868 42,537,190 50,125,269 49,257,591 48,389,913
3,221,718 2,005,774 (5,202,676) (21,839.218) (24,873,090) 176,184 7,518,968 12,586,917 9,603,101 15,557,526 20,987,491
(94,983,382) (83,047,235) (146,002,165) (150,348,448) (46,458,723)
11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555
18,452.486 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486
19,928,768
6,642,949
19,928,768
6,642,049
27,126,182 39,182,263 72,336,486 108,504,729 54,252,364
8,539,724 12,335,157 22,772,597 34,158,896 17,079,448
35,665,006 51,517,420 95,109,083 142,663,625 71,331,812
0 0 0 (0)
1,175,697 1,175,697 2,351,394 2,351,394
1,175,697 2,351,394 4,702,787 7,054,181
(-0a,71,717)
!19,928,768)
Consortium Debt&Equity Irr.
Consortium Equity Irr'
176,184 7,518,968 12,586,917 9,603,101 15,557,526 20,987,491
176,184 7,695,152 20,282,069 29,885,170 45,442,696 59,443,177
S- 20,987,491
2,351,394 2,351,394
9,405,575 11,756,968
2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394
14,108,362 16,459,755 18,811,149
2,351,394
175,052
20,987,491
20,987,491S (2,071,717)
- (t1u,928,1(88)
1375%
14 74%
Assumptions:
15% of Total Debt Is required to be placed In Reserved fund.
Subordinate Debt is for 10 years at 12%
---
Appendix 11-2-2
Cashflow From Operations.
Operating Revenue (From 11-6-1)
Operating Costs (From 11-16-1)
Gross Operating Income
ADF Received (From 11-4-1 (Constr), 11-1-1 (Oper))
Grants of Rights Fee (From ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Available for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt (From 11-5-1)
Principal Payment (From 11-5-1)
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investment Cashflow.
Capital Expenditure (From 11-4-1)
Grants (From 11-4-1)
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Equlty Capital (From 11-4-1)
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordinate Debt Drawdown
Senior Debt Capital (From 11-4-1)
EIB Loan Construction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt
Not Projeoct Cash Flow:
Value of Cash Reserve
Remaining for Sub Debt-
Sub Debt Required
Cummulative Sub Debt
Sub Debt Paid
Hemaining I-or f l)ivlelds
Equity & Sub Debt Cash Flow to Conortilumn.
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium'
x1000 DRX
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
99,863,811 108,660,584 118.254,285 128,765,456 139,212,025 150,579,766 161,427,509 171,497,093 182,263,677 191,993,964
(39,945,524) (43,464,234) (47,301,714) (51,506,182) (55,684,810) (60,231,907) (64,571,004) (68,598,837) (72,905,471) (76,797,585)
59918.286 _ 5.18 5Q 70_952.571 77.259.274 83.527.215 90,347,860 96.856.505 102.898.256 109.358.206 115.196.378
15,025,223 15,468,661 15,924,867 16,394,219 21,028,710 21,489,686 21,967,415
(295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (205,224) (295,224) (295,224) (17,279,457)
4.642,2 8 Q.3z1 86.582.214 93.358.268 104260.701 111.542.322 118.528.696 102.603,032 109.062.982 97.,16.21
(35,911,061) (38,172,044) (34,270,923)
74,648,285 80,369,787 86,582,214 93,358,268 104,260,701 111,542,322 118,528,696 66,691,971 70,890,938 63,645,999
26,149,029 24,349,941 22,470,753 20,504,575 19,311,604 18,016,037 16,609,052 15,081,066 13,421,673 11,619,573
21,373,206 22,304,615 23,316,125 13.871,756 15,064,727 16,360,294 17,767,279 19,295,265 20,954,658 22,756,758
47,522,235 46,654,557 45,786,878 34,376,331 34,376,331 34,376,331 34,376,331 34,376,331 34,376,331 34,376,331
27,126,051 33,715,230 40,795,335 58,981,937 69,884,370 77,165,991 84,152,365 32,315,639 36,514,607 29,269,668
27,120,051 33,115,230 40.70(,330 68,081,037 60,884,310 77,100,001 84,142,305 32,310,030 36,014,007 2U,2O,008
27,126,051 33,715,230 40,795,335 58,981,937 69,884,370 77,165,991 84,152,365 32,315,639 36,514,607 29,269,668
1,175,697 1,175,697
1,350,748 1,175,697
20,176,302 32,b39,b33 40,100,330 b8,081,037 00,884,370 77,16B,901 84,102,300 32,315,030 36,614,60/ 20,2L,OtJt
12,040,634 15,818,487 18,357,001 26,541,872 31,447,96600 34,724,00696 37,808,504 14,542,038 16,431,573 13,171,351
11,598,886 14,642,790 18,357,901 26,541,872 31,447,966 34,724,696 37,868,564 14,542,038 16,431,573 13,171,351
Appendix 11-2-3
Cashflow From Operatlops:
Operating Revenue (From 11-6-1)
Operating Costs (From 11.16-1)
Gross Operating Income
ADF Received (From 11-4-1 (Constr), 11-1-1 (Oper))
Grants of Rights Fee (From ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Available for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt (From 11-5-1)
Principal Payment (From I-5-1)
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investment Cashflow:
Capital Expenditure (From 11-4-1)
Grants (From 11-4-1)
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Equty Capital, (From 11-4-1)
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordlnate Debt Drawdown
Senior Debt Capital (From 11-4-1)
EIB Loan Construction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt
Net PIoject Cash Flow,
Value of Cash Reserve
Remaining for Sub Debt
Sub, Debt Required
Cummulative Sub Debt
Sub Debt Paid
Remaining For Dividends
I quity & Sub, Debt Cash Plow to Consortiumn
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium-
x1000 DRX
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
202,318,630 212,046,093
(80,927,452) (84,818,437)
-_121.391.178 ___- 227.6 0
(18.208,677)
__._103.12.01
(36,113,875)
67,068,626
9,662,492
24,713,840
34,3768.331
32,692,295
(19,084,148)
-10143.607
(37,850,228)
70,293,280
7,537,101
26,839,230
34,376,331
35,916,949
222,292,873 232,889,987 244,172,040
(88,917,149) (93,155,995) (97,668,816)
13.375.724 _13,33.992 .1..1406.93.22
(20,006,359)
113.309.3K8
(39,679,278)
73,690,087
5,228,928
29,147,404
34,376,331
39,313,756
(20,960,099)
11.773.894
(41,670,863)
77,203,031
2,722,251
31,654,080
34,376,331
42,826,700
(21,975,484)
124.27.741
(43,584,709)
80,943,031
2022 2023
256,056,463 268,577,684 281,772,123 295,678,486
(102,422,585) (107,431,073) (112,708,849) (118,271,394)
_13,03A71 -1011,40.01 __ 180f03,274 __17 Q740791
(23,045.082)
(45,706,079)
84,882,718
(24,171,992)
_ 30.8274019
(47,941,117)
89,033,502
(25,359,491)
1A317;81
(50,296,324)
93,407,459
(26,611,064)
(52,778,610)
98,017,418
80.943,031 84,882,718 89,033,502 93,407,459 98,017,418
32,002,206 30,016,U49 30,313,7bU 42,820,700 80,043,031 84,882,718 80,033,602 03,407,460 08,011,418
32,692,295 35,916,949 39,313,756 42,826,700 80,943,031 84,882.718 89,033,502 93,407,459 98,017,418
32,602,295 30,916,940 39,313,750 42,826,700 80,043,031 84,882,718 80,033,502 93,407,459 98,017,418
14,711,533 10,102,027 11,001,100 19,272,015 30,424,304 38,197,223 40,005,078 42,033,356 44,107,838
14,711,533 10,162,627 17,601,190 19,272,015 30,424,364 38,197,223 40,065,070 42,033,350 44,107.838
Appendix 11-3-1
Base Case Capital Investments:
PROJECT YEAR
Name Aggregate 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Indirect costs (40%) 208,130,000 81,191,298 13,451,208 27,036,302 44,783,996 41,667,196
Terminal Building 84,712,455 7,624,121 18,636,740 28,802,235 29,649,359
Satellite 19,887,539 1,789,879 4,375,259 6,761,763 6,960,639
Police Building 3,642,699 692,113 2,950,586
Building & Ground Maint. 7,072,771 4,809,484 2,263,287
Mobile Equipment WS 2,674,504 2,112,858 561,646
IKA Clinic 4,356,217 2,657,292 1,524,676 174,249
Ramp Service 2,741,413 740,182 2,001,231
Sewage Plant 8,264,436 7,768,570 495,866
Air Mail 2,365,877 1,040,986 1,324,891
Control Tower 24,277,608 2,184,985 5,341,074 8,254,387 8,497,163
Fire/Rescue Station 4,581,539 2,703,108 1,740,985 137,446
Runways 14,780,779 5,173,273 7,833,813 1,773,693
Taxiways/Aprons 40,995,835 14,348,542 21,727,793 4,919,500
Misc. Roadways 5,489,239 93,317 1,756,556 1,838,895 1,619,326 181,145
Employee Parking (S) 981,815 225,817 755,998
Passenger Parking 733,500 168,705 564,795
Earthworks 69,992,766 2,099,783 14,698,481 29,396,962 23,797,540
Aircraft Bridge 5,902,791 5,194,456 708,335
Airfield Light Sys & P S 9,256,169 2,776,851 5,090,893 1,388,425
Total: 520,839,952 94,983,382 83,047,235 146,002,165 150,348,448 46,458,723
x1000 DRX
Appendix 11-4-1
Sources and Uses During Construction:
Aggregate 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Sources
Airport Development Fund 65,567,842 10,499,879 13,554,341 15,909,622 13,087,634 12,516,369
Greek State Grant 44,286,062 11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555
EU Grant 73,810,103 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486
Ordinary Equity 39,857,535 19,928,768 19,928,768
Subordinate Debt 13,285,899 6,642,949 6,642,949
EIB Loan 301,402,024 27,126,182 39,182,263 72,336,486 108,504,729 54,252,364
Commercial Loan 94,885,822 8,539,724 12,335,157 22,772,597 34,158,896 17,079,448
Total Sources 633,095,287 102,261,543 94,595,802 167,114,462 185,275,299 83,848,181
Uses
Capital Expenditure 520,839,952 94,983,382 83,047,235 146,002,165 150,348,448 46,458,723
Operating Losses 37,311,945 4,242,490 4,830,857 7,314,649 10,860,704 10,063,246
Interest During Construction 74,943,390 3,035,671 6,717,710 13,797,649 24,066,148 27,326,213
Total Uses 633,095,287 102,261,543 94,595,802 167,114,462 185,275,299 83,848,181
x1000 DRX
Appendix 11-5-1
Debt Analysis:
I 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000[ 2001
Drawdown.
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commercial Loans:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
301,402,024
94,885,822
27,126,182 39,182,263 72,336,486
8,539,724 12,335,157 22,772,597
27,126,182
2,332,852
2,332,852
8,539,724
702,819
702,819
3,035,671
3,035,671
108,504,729 54,252,364
34,158,896 17,079,448
39,182,263 72,336,486 108,504,729 54,252,364
5,702,526 11,923,464
5,702,526 11,923,464
12,335,157
1,015,183
1,015,183
22,772,597
1,874,185
1,874,185
6,717,710 13,797,649
6,717,710 13,797,649
21,254,871 25,920,574
21,254,871 25,920,574
34,158,896
2,811,277
2,811,277
17,079,448
1,405,639
1,405,639
24,066,148 27,326,213
24,066,148 27,326,213
I I CONSTRUCTION
x1000 DRX
8.60% Repayment period (years):
8.768
34,376,331
8 years Interest only; Annuity thereafter
Comm. Bank: 8.23%
301,402,024
25,920,574
25,920,574
94,885,822
7,809,103
10,542,869
18,351,972
33,729,677
10,542,869
44,272,546
EIB rate:
AF(1 7y, 8.6%)
Annuity:
Appendix 11-5-2
Debt Analysis:
[ 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
[Drawdown:
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commercial Loans:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
x1000 DRX
301,402,024 301,402,024
25,920,574 25,920,574
25,920,574
84,342,953
6,941,425
10,542,869
17,484,294
32,861,999
10,542,869
43,404,868
25,920,574
73,800,084
6,073,747
10,542,869
16,616,616
31,994,321
10,542,869
42,537,190
292,946,267
25,920,574
8,455,757
34,376,331
63,257,215
5,206,069
10,542,869
15,748,938
31,126,643
18,998,626
50,125,269
283,763,315
25,193,379
9,182,952
34,376,331
52,714,346
4,338,391
10,542,869
14,881,260
29,531,770
19,725,821
49,257,591
273,790,629
24,403,645
9,972,686
34,376,331
42,171,477
3,470,713
10,542,869
14,013,582
27,874,358
20,515,555
48,389,913
262,960,292
23,545,994
10,830,337
34,376,331
31,628,607
2,603,034
10,542,869
13,145,904
26,149,029
21,373,206
47,522,235
Appendix 11-5-3
Debt Analysis:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Drawdown:
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commercial Loans:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
x1000 DRX
251,198,546
22,614,585
11,761,746
34,376,331
21,085,738
1,735,356
10,542,869
12,278,225
24,349,941
22,304,615
46,654,557
238,425,290
21,603,075
12,773,256
34,376,331
10,542,869
867,678
10,542,869
11,410,547
22,470,753
23,316,125
45,786,878
224,553,534
20,504,575
13,871,756
34,376,331
20,504,575
13,871,756
34,376,331
209,488,807
19,311,604
15,064,727
34,376,331
19,311,604
15,064,727
34,376,331
193,128,513
18,016,037
16,360,294
34,376,331
18,016,037
16,360,294
34,376,331
175,361,234
16,609,052
17,767,279
34,376,331
16,609,052
17,767,279
34,376,331
Appendix 11-5-4
Debt Analysis:
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
IDrawdown:
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commercial Loans:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
x1OQ DRXx1000 DRX
156,065,969
15,081,066
19,295,265
34,376,331
15,081,066
19,295,265
34,376,331
135,111,311
13,421,673
20,954,658
34,376,331
13,421,673
20,954,658
34,376,331
112,354,553
11,619,573
22,756,758
34,376,331
87,640,713
9,662,492
24,713,840
34,376,331
11,619,573 9,662,492
60,801,484
7,537,101
26,839,230
34,376,331
7,537,101
31,654,080
5,228,928
29,147,404
34,376,331
5,228,928
0
2,722,251
31,654,080
34,376,331
2,722,251
22,756,758 24,713,840 26,839,230 29,147,404 31,654,080
34,376,331 34,376,331 34,376,331 34,376,331 34,376,331
Appendix 11-6-1
Operating Revenues by Project:
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
---. 0 5r9' CY rQ V :Q 1 3 4 -2r,
Terminal Building
Satellite
Police Building
Building & Ground Maint.
Mobile Equipment WS
Catering
IKA Clinic
Ramp Service
Sewage Plant
Cargo Facility
Air Mail
Veterinary Building
Forwarders Building
Control Tower
Fire/Rescue Station
Hotel
Fuel Farm
Runways
Taxiways/Aprons
Roadways
Employee Parking (S)
Passenger Parking
Earthworks
Aircraft Bridge
Airfield Light Sys & P S
Convention Center
Home Base
20,209,027 32,413,617
4,731,197 7,589,100
1,319,404
3,108,478
1,067,490
1,525,608
403,837
134,612
179,483
357,200
662,601
7,903,329
22,273,019
1,413,412
1,631,154
1,067,490
428,640
921,906
820,148
2,060,441
1,067,486
833,006
220,502
73,501
98,001
252,321
418,800
4,893,269
13,790,123
875,100
1,009,913
1,067,486
302,785
651,220
11,667,766
2,034,252
4,496,958
1,067,495
2,648,572
701,093
233,698
311,597
478,014
1,004,972
12,232,090
34,472,255
2,187,557
2,524,559
1,067,495
573,617
1,233,719
16,543,714
2,889,845
6,094,376
1,067,500
4,348,193
1,150,992
383,664
511,552
609,970
1,411,859
17,421,261
49,096,282
3,115,576
3,595,543
1,067,500
731,964
1,574,287
21,089,599
3,689,611
7,518,135
1,067,505
6,489,692
1,717,860
572,620
763,493
707,122
1,786,210
22,288,694
62,813,591
3,986,055
4,600,123
1,067,505
848,547
1,825,030
0 0
26,689,955
4,675,464
9,150,804
1,067,510
9,495,992
2,513,645
837,882
1,117,176
819,749
2,246,032
28,293,244
79,735,506
5,059,895
5,839,392
1,067,510
983,698
2,115,710
Total Operating Revenuee: 1 53,374,325 84,400,381 128,765,456 182,263,677 232,889,987 295,678,486
Note: The above table is a consolidation of Appendices 11-6 through 11-15 as they relate to the base case. Every fifth year Is only shown.
Appendix 11-7-1
In terminal Concessions:
Revenues:
Revenue Contribution to
Airport Co. per passenger
Area (ECU) (DRX)
Departures:
Duty Free: 0.54 157.5
Retail: 0.54 157.5
Lounges, etc: 0.19 55.4
Restaurants: 0.19 55.4
Landside Areas: 0.11 32.1
All Areas: 1.57 458.0
Source: Business Plan
Revenue Contribution from Property Development:
Item Revenue Contribution per year
In Millions
(ECU) (DRX)
Office Rental 2.7 787.6
Other In-terminal Space 2,1 612.6
All: 4.8 1,400.2
Source: Business Plan
Appendix 11-7-2
Concession Revenue per year:
2001 2002 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Concession revenue: 5,866,585 7,028,242 9,475,373 14,665,164 20,886,509 26,722,117 33,921,027
Rental Revenue: 1,400,160 1,618,025 1,982,150 2,652,564 3,384,804 3,923,916 4,548,894
Total (x1000DRX): 7,266,745 8,646,267 11,457,523 17,317,728 24,271,313 30,646,033 38,469,921
This total Revenue will be split between the Main Terminal & Satellite Building.
For simplicity, assume at a proportion according to their size:
Main Terminal Building:
Satellite:
Source: Master Plan
Area of Building:
160,000
37,000
Therefore, proportions are as follows:
Main Terminal Building: 0.81
Satellite: 0.19
Revenues, adjusted to each area:
2001
Main Terminal Building:
Satellite:
x1000 DRX
5,901,925
1,364,820
2002
7,022,349
1,623,918
2005
9,305,603
2,151,921
2010
14,065,160
3,252,568
2015
19,712,742
4,558,571
2020
24,890,179
5,755,854
2025
31,244,606
7,225,315
2001
Appendix 11-8-1
Catering Facilities:
Assume:
8.9ECU (2596.13DRX) per departing International passenger
0.32ECU (93.34DRX) per departing Domestic passenger
Source: Business Plan
Passenger Mix:
67% International
33% Domestic
Assume 1/2 of the traffic is served by the catering:
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
International 11,140,907 17,994,156 27,849,801 39,664,411 50,746,492 64,417,544
Domestic 199,402 322,062 498,460 709,920 908,269 1,152,956
Total (x1000 DRX) 11,340,309 18,316,219 28,348,261 40,374,331 51,654,761 65,570,500
Assuming Catering Is a concession, the revenue to the Airport Company is the Following:
7% of profit+47,500ECU/Hectre (13,855,750DRX/Hectre). Catering requires 1.9 HA
Source: Business Plan
Year 1 Lease: 26,325,925 DRX
Revenue to Airport Company:
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Profit Share: 793,822 1,282,135 1,984,378 2,826,203 3,615,833 4,589,935
Lease: 26,326 37,269 49,874 63,642 73,778 85,529
Total (xl000 DRX) 820,148 1,319,404 2,034,252 2,889,845 3,689,611 4,675,464
Appendix 11-9-1
Airside Charges:
Passenger Charge of 26ECU (7584 DRX)
Source: Coopers and Lybrand
The basis of this charge is the sum of (i)passenger and (ii)ADF charges retained by the Airport
Company, at 30% above the average of the three highest charges levied at European airports in
1995 on per passenger basis.
The ADF is the Airport Development Fund. It is a special tax which is collected in Greek Airports
for the reconstruction of other Airports. It is approximately 16ECU.
Therefore, the Airside revenues are at 10ECU (2,917DRX) per passenger.
2001
Revenue (xl 000DRX) 37,366,785
2002
44,765,871
2003
49,455,357
2005
60,352,695
2010
93,408,690
2015
133,035,087
2020
170,204,569
2025
216,057,500
This figure will be split between the alrslde (Runways, taxiways) and the terminal as Passenger related charges
charged directly to the airlines for the use of the terminal.
Proportions to be used:
Terminal
Airside
50%
50%
The Proportions are based on values found In Airport Infrastructure Finance concerning average revenues
for European Airports.
2001 2002 2003 2005 2010 2015
Terminal
Runways/Taxiways
x1000 DRX
18,683,392
18,683,392
22,382,936
22,382,936
24,727,679
24,727,679
30,176,348
30,176,348
46,704,345
46,704,345
66,517,543
66,517,543
85,102,285
85,102,285
108,028,750
108,028,750
2020 2025
--
-
Appendix 11-9-2
A further breakdown is made.
The Terminal consists of the Main Terminal Building, the Satellite Terminal, and the Loading Bridges.
Revenues are assumed allocated according to initial capital investment proportions.
Main Terminal:
Satellite:
Loading Bridges:
77%
18%
5%
Revenues:
Main Terminal:
Satellite:
Loading Bridges:
2001
14,307,102
3,366,377
1,009,913
2002
17,140,086
4,032,961
1,209,888
2003
18,935,610
4,455,438
1,336,631
2005
23,108,014
5,437,180
1,631,154
2010
35,764,589
8,415,197
2,524,559
2015
50,936,858
11,985,143
3,595,543
2020
65,168,416
15,333,745
4,600,123
Spliting the Airside into its components, according to initial capital investment, the proportions are:
Runways: 26%
Taxiways/Aprons: 74%
Revenues:
If DB
Runways:
Taxiways/Aprons:
2001
4,893,269
13,790,123
2002
5,862,197
16,520,738
2003
6,476,297
18,251,382
2005
7,903,329
22,273,019
2010
12,232,090
34,472,255
2015
17,421,261
49,096,282
2025
82,724,718
19,464,640
5,839,392
2020
22,288,694
62,813,591
2025
28,293,244
79,735,506
Appendix 11-9-3
If BOT
Revenue is from lease according to size of area:
Lease at 47,500 ECU/HA. (13,855,750 DRX/HA)
Runways:
Taxiways/Aprons:
sq. m.
496800
2067560
H.A. Lease Price
49.68 688,354
206.756 2,864,759
x1 000DRX
Also, take 7% of yearly Revenues:
Runways:
Taxiways/Aprons:
2001 2002
1,030,883 1,205,815
3,830,068 4,466,968
2003
1,304,485
4,819,849
2005 2010
1,527,708 2,160,313
5,614,636 7,840,264
2015
2,883,543
10,362,127
2020 2025
3,489,304 4,216,877
12,425,373 14,888,627
~
Appendix 11-10-1
Cargo Facilities:
Business plan is set up differently for the Cargo Facility:
It is set up with a projected return to the Airport Company of 4.2 Million ECU (1,225 Million DRX) the first year.
The Airport Company is assumed to take 15% of the revenues of the Cargo Concessionaire.
Therefore, total Cargo revenues are projected at 8,167 Million DRX.
Going Backwards, a per ton revenue for cargo for the first year is: 57,111DRX
Revenue (xl 000DRX):
2001 2005 2010
8,166,730 14,956,940 25,966,391
Revenue to Airport Company: 1,225,010 2,243,541
Lease:
3,894,959 6,394,401 9,543,665 13,964,694
There are four projects which involve the Cargo Facilities.
These are: the Cargo Facilities, Air Mail Building, Veterinary Building, and Forwarders Building.
The amount of revenue allocated to each of the projects will be based on the following ratios:
Cargo Facility
Air Mail
Veterinary Building
Forwarders Builiding
Cargo Facility
Air Mail
Veterinary Building
Forwarders Builiding
Total
0.68
0.18
0.06
0.08
2001
833,006
220,502
73,501
98,001
1,225,010
2005
1,525,608
403,837
134,612
179,483
2,243,541
2010
2,648,572
701,093
233,698
311,597
3,894,959
2015
4,348,193
1,150,992
383,664
511,552
6,394,401
2020
6,489,692
1,717,860
572,620
763,493
9,543,665
2015
42,629,340
2020
63,624,435
2025
93,097,961
2025
9,495,992
2,513,645
837,882
1,117,176
13,964,694
Im.=m=..'..'====== m
Appendix 11-11-1
Ramp Service Revenue:
"Aircraft Handling"
Charge:
763 ECU/ATM
222,567 DRX/ATM
Source: Coopers & Lybrand
Revenue (x1000 DRX)
If Concession:
4.5% of Turnover: 1,350,943 1,608,441 1,759,165 2,104,071 3,152,835 4,379,208 5,529,784 6,845,761
Lease:
Required Space:
Ground Area
Building Area
Office Area
1.3 Ha
12,400 Sq.m.
7,027 Sq.m.
Cost (ECU)
47,500
75
205
61,750
930,000
1,440,535
2,432,285
Source: Coopers & Lybrand
Total Lease In DRX: 709,498 (xl000)
2,060,441 2,428,337 2,636,453 3,108,478 4,496,958 6,094,376 7,518,135 9,150,804
2000 2001
30,020,963
2002
35,743,138
2003
39,092,566
2005
46,757,135
2010
70,062,997
2015
97,315,727
2020
122,884,094
2025
152,128,018
Total Revenue (Including Lease):
-- --
Appendix 11-11-2
Equipment:
In order to calculate the costs of the equipment portion of this project, the following assumptions were
used:
Personnel:
Labor
Supervision
Source: Master Plan
Labor Rates:
Labor
Supervision
Source: Business Plan
1o00
200
6,000,000 DRX
7,000,000 DRX
Therefore annual labor Costs are:
12,200,000,000 DRX
For Operations and Maintenance assume extra 15%:
14,030,000,000
Equipment:
Number of Vehicles:
Source: Master Plan
DRX
3,427
Assume 5,000,00DRX average Investment cost per vehicle:
Cost of Vehicles: 17,135,000,000
If DBB:
2000 2001 2002
Added Investment Costs:
Operating Revenues:
17,135,000
30,020,963 35,743,138 30,002,566 46,757,135 70,062,997 97,315,727 122,884,094 152,128,018
14,030,000 16,213,068 17,347,983 19,861,705 26,579,442 33,916,699
2003 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Operating Costs:
2000
39,318,749 45,581,207
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Fuel Facility:
Consumption Per Passenger:
85 It/passenger
Source: Coopers & Lybrand
Jet Fuel Price (Spot):
48.4 US Cents/gallon (January 1995)
Source: Airport Infrastructure Finance
In Drachmae/Liter:
35.84
Assume all departing flights refuel, therefore only consider half the traffic value:
2001
Revenues:
(xl 000RX)
19,512,200
2005
31,514,990
2010
48,776,180
2015
69,468,305
2020
88,877,477
If BOT Airport Company Takes: 0.0022 ECU/llter (0.642DRX/It) plus 47,500 ECU/HA (5
Source: Business Plan
Annual Lease:
2025
112,820,975
HA total Area Required)
69,278,750 DRX
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Fuel: 349,521 564,526 873,725 1,244,382 1,592,057 2,020,956
Lease: 69,279 98,075 131,247 167,477 194,152 225,075
Total: 418,800 662,601 1,004,972 1,411,859 1,786,210 2,246,032
x1000 DRX
Appendix 11-13-1
Hotel:
600 bed, medium to high priced
Source: Master Plan
Assumptions:
50% occupancy
90,000DRX per/room
(Typical case for the Athens Area)
Yearly Revenues:
9,855,000,000
Lease:
865,000
252,320,500
Source: Business Plan
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Lease: 252,321 357,200 478,014 609,970 707,122 819,749'
x1000 DRX
Appendix 11-14-1
Passenger Car Parking:
For first year:
3 million ECU
875.1 million DRX
Source: Business Plan
Per passenger rate:
68.3 DRX/passenger
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Parking Revenue 875,100 1,413,412 2,187,557 3,115,576 3,986,055 5,059,895
For Employee parking assume the same revenue stream if given out as a concession.
Appendix 11-15-1
Home Base Lease:
Assumption for this case is that Olympic Airways will not be able to construct Its own facilities.
AIA therefore delivers the facilities DBO by subsidizing the construction costs. The amount which it will
require Olympic to pay back for the subsidy will be calculated using the Equivalent Annual Costs method.
Operation and Maintenance of the faclilties Is still provided by Olympic. Also, an extra land lease Is paid to AIA.
The land lease is the same amount for BOT or DBO delivery.
Construction Costs:
118,252,750
x1000DRX
Assume subsidy of 50% of Construction Costs:
59,126,375
Expected Rate of Return:
Annual Depreciation:
Assume $traightline over 25 years.
12%
2,365,055
Annual Depreclatilon Tax Shield:
Assume constant taxes of 35% per year starting 2010
827,769
59,126,375 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Capital Investment (591,264) (15,964,121) (36,658,353) (5,912,638)
Depreciation Tax Shlold
Total: (591,264) (15,964,121) (36,658,353) (5,912,638) - -
NPV @12%
PV @ 2001:
(46,795,509)
(65,744,321)
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016
827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769
827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769
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2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2026
827,769 827,7689 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,760
827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769 827,769
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25 year annuity factor: 7.84
Break-even annual After Tax Lease: 8,382,399
x1000DRX
Before tax, add 35% 11,316,239
Land Lease:
Total Required Area:
470,00OSq. M.
Source: Olympic Airways
Annual Lease @ 47,500ECU/HA (13,855,750DRX/HA)
651,220,250
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Ground Lease per year (xlO00DRX) 651,220 752,550 805,229 861,595
IF DBO:
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Required Investment: (591,264) (15,964,121) (36,658,353) (5,912,638)
Revenue:
x1000 DRX
11,967,459 13,829,595 14,797,667 15,833,504
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016
921,906 977,221 1,035,854 1,098,005 1,163,885 1,233,719 1,307,742 1,386,206 1,455,516 1,513,737 1,574,287
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
16,941,849 17,958,360 19,035,862 20,178,013 21,388,694 22,672,016 24,032,337 25,474,277 26,747,991 27,817,910 28,930,627
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2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2026
1,621,515 1,670,161 1,720,265 1,771,873 1,825,030 1,879,781 1,936,174 1,994,259 2,054,087 2,115,710
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
30,692,502 31,613,277 32,561,675 33,538,526 34,544,681 35,581,022 36,648,452 37,747,906 38,880,34329,798,546
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Operating Expenses (Excluding Those During Construction):
2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Terminal Building
Satellite
Police Building
Building & Ground Maint.
Mobile Equipment WS
Catering
IKA Clinic
Ramp Service
Sewage Plant
Cargo Facility
Air Mail
Veterinary Building
Forwarders Building
Control Tower
Fire/Rescue Station
Hotel
Fuel Farm
Runways
Taxiways/Aprons
Roadways
Employee Parking (S)
Passenger Parking
Earthworks
Aircraft Bridge
Airfield Light Sys & P S
Convention Center
Home Base
Total:
x1000 DRX
7,616,874
1,788,177
327,531
635,944
240,477
391,687
246,493
743,092
212,727
2,182,908
411,947
1,329,006
3,686,118
373,257
66,761
65,952
401,378
629,401
12,044,500
2,827,630
517,923
1,005,613
380,264
619,371
389,777
1,175,046
336,383
18,375,694
4,313,974
790,169
1,534,214
580,149
944,944
594,663
1,792,709
513,202
3,451,814 5,266,261
651,408 993,820
2,101,546
5,828,828
590,229
105,569
104,290
634,696
995,267
3,206,224
8,892,753
900,483
161,062
159,110
968,324
1,518,429
21,349,730 33,760,153 51,506,182 72,905,471 93,155,995 118,271,394
The assumption made for operating costs Is that It 1s 40% of the year's revenue. This
is backed up by cases of various International Airports found in Airport Infrastructure
Finance.
Once the total operating cost for the entire Airport were found they were distributed
to eaoch of the projects cooi dlng to their size,
26,010,249
6,106,302
1,118,460
2,171,635
821,184
1,337,540
841,728
2,537,526
726,423
7,454,236
1,406,723
4,538,314
12,587,427
1,274,606
227,978
225,215
1,370,634
2,149,291
33,234,962
7,802,414
1,429,128
2,774,837
1,049,279
1,709,061
1,075,530
3,242,359
928,197
9,524,755
1,797,460
5,798,695
16,083,763
1,628,646
291,303
287,772
1,751,347
2,746,287
42,195,302
9,905,990
1,814,430
3,522,949
1,332,171
2,169,833
1,365,499
4,116,518
1,178,444
12,092,685
2,282,066
7,362,311
20,420,039
2,067,739
369,839
365,357
2,223,520
3,486,702
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CashfloW From Operations:
Operating Revenue
Operating Costs
Gross Operating Income
ADF Received
Grants of Rights Fee (ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Available for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt
Principal Payment
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investment Cashfiow:
Capital Expenditure
Grants
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Equity Capital
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordinate Debt Drawdown
Senior Debt Capital
EIB Loan Cpnstruction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt
Net Projuoct Cash Flow:
Value of Cash Reserve
Remaining for Sub Debt
Sub Debt Required
Cummulative Sub. Debt
Sub Debt Paid
Remaining Vio Dividends
Equity & Sub Debt Cash Flow to Consoitlum:
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium:
x1000 DRX
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(4,242.490)
_L4,24240
6,656,708
(4,830,857)
(410,730,9857
10,730,980
(7,314,649)
17.314.649)
11,257,844
(10,860,704)
(10.860.704
20,648,499
(10,063,246)
(10.063.246)
16,391,212
2414.21 5,900A122 943,J95 9,787.796 6.327.967
2,414,218
3,393,211
3,393,211
(978,993)
5,900,122
6,000,824
6,000,824
(100,702)
3,943,195
12,680,291
12,680,291
(8,737,096)
9,787,796
24,524,820
24,524,820
(14,737,025)
6,327,967
27,490,212
27,490,212
(21,162,245)
50,868,122
(20,347,249)
30.520.873
15,600,633
(320)
46.121.186
46,121,186
33,932,107
10,606,142
44,538,249
1,582,936
2002 2003
59,773,064
(23,909,226)
35.863.838
16,173,201
(320)
52.036.719
52,036,719
33,059,221
10,606,142
43,665,364
8,371,356
65,098,409
(26,039,364)
39.059.045
16,698,540
(320)
55.757.266
55,757,266
32,186,336
10,606,142
42,792,478
12,964,788
2004 2005
70,932,022
(28,372,809)
42.559.213
17,240,290
(320)
59.799,183
59,799,183
31,313,450
19,112,647
50,426,097
9,373,086
77,386,320
(30,954,528)
46A431.792
17,798,946
(320)
64.230Q418
64,230,418
29,709,005
19,844,206
49,553,211
14,677,206
(94,983,382) (69,289,956) (135,065.221) (174,253,487) (50,597,667)
11,071,555 11,071.555 11,071,555 11,071,555
18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486
19.928,768
6,642,949
19,928,768
6,642,949
30,321,090 30,321,090 66,706,397 121,284,358 54,577,961
9,545,528 9,545,528 21,000,162 38,182,113 17,181,951
39,866,618 39,866,618 87,706,559 159,466,471 71,759,912
0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 1,582,036 8,371,356 12,964,788 9,373,086 14,677,206
1,582,936 9,954,292 22,919,080 32,292,166 46,969,372
1,175,697 1,175,697 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394
1,175,697 2,351,394 4,702,787 7,054,181 9,405,575 11,756,968 14,108,362 16,459,755 18,811,149
(28,b71,717)
(19,928,768)
(268,71,717)
- (19,928,768)
Consortium Debt&Equity irr.
Consortium Equity Irr:
12 28%
13.19%
Assumptions,
Those concerning trafflo, and individual projects are seen In Appendix II.
1b% of lolal Lubt li rtleqiisd to be in lsorlvde funi
siuboldinatl debt Is for 10 years at 12%
Prolforma was built as in the Base Case, Not all shoots appear In this appendix
--
Appendix Ill-1-2
Caohflow from Operatuon:
Operating Revenue
Operating Costs
Gross Operating Income
ADF Received
Grants of Rights Fee (ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Available for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt
Principal Payment
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investment Cashflow
Capital Expenditure
Grants:
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Equity Capital,
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordinate Debt Drawdown
Senir Loanbt Cpinstructon Amount
EIB Loan Construction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt
Nut Project Cash Flow.
Value of Cash Reserve
Remaining for Sub Debt'
Sub. Debt Required
Cummulative Sub Debt
Sub Debt Paid
Iim iiilniig For Dividende
Equity & Sub Debt Cash Flow to Consotluin
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium,
x1000 DRX
200R 20n7 90R 200 9 010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
83,443,225 90.091,955 71,256,806 105,026,018 113,499,986 122,034,717 131,283.174 139,976,854 147,906.655 156,348,144 163,826,314
(33,393,290) (36,036,782) (38,902,723) (42,010,407) (45,399,994) (48,815,487) (52,513,270) (55,990,741) (59,162,662) (62,539,258) (65,530,525)
50.89.935 4.055173 58.354.084 63.015.611 68.99.991 73.22.23Q 78.769,904 83.986.112 88.743.993 93.808.886 98295.788
18,325,035 18,866,258 19,423,055 19,995,886 20,585,223 21,028,710 21,489,686 21,967,415
(295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (14,744,368)
_6 &tlJ942 ._2620.2Q7 _7894L15 _82.7_t6.27Z 88.389990 _93.95.716 -9 U.54.366 1 5.830 _546J _93.,1.2562 _ A.51_A2Q
(30,957,069) (32,729,782) (29,242,997)
68,119,746 72,626,207 77,481,915 82,716,272 88,389,990 93,956,716 99,964,366 105,658,303 57,491,700 60,783,880 54,308,423
28,041,646 26,305,962 24,496,078 22,605,612 20,627,634 19,427,503 18,124,161 16,708,732 15,171,575 13,502,224 11,689,308
20,638,680 21,501,478 22,438,477 23,456,058 13,955,008 15,155,138 16,458,480 17,873,910 19,411,066 21,080,418 22,893,334
48,680,326 47,807,440 46,934,555 46,061,669 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641
19,439,420 24,818,766 30,547,360 36,654,603 53,807,348 59,374,075 65,381,725 71,075,661 22,909,058 26,201,239 19,725,782
10,439,420 24,810,766 30,647,360 36,654,603 53,807,348 59,374,075 65,381,725 71,075,681 22,009,058 26,201,239 19,125,782
59,799,927
6,608,866 24,818,766 30,547,360 36,654,603 53,807,348 59,374,075 65,381,725 71,075,661 22,909,058 26,201,239 19,725,782
2,351,394
14,553,677
6,608,866
1,175,697 1,175,697
15,729,374 1,175.697
* ,01f,31)2 21),371,03 30,054,003 03,007,340 50,374,075 05,381,725 71,075,001 22,009,050 20,201,230 19,725,782
8,608,888 10,819,600 14,302,045 18,404,571 24,213,307 28,718,334 20,421,776 31,984,048 10,309,076 11.790,557 8,876,602
4,090,226 13,217,248 16,494,571 24.213,307 26,718,334 29,421,776 31,984,048 10,309,076 11,790,557 8,876,602
xl000 
DR
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Cashflow Prom Operations;
Operating Revenue
Operating Costs
Gross Operaing Income
ADF Received
Grants of Rights Fee (ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Available for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt
Principal Payment
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investment Cashflow:
Capital Expenditure
Grants
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Equity Capital;
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordinate Debt Drawdown
Senior Debt Capital
EIB Loan Construction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt
Net Project Cash Flow
Value of Cash Reserve:
Remaining for Sub Debt,
Sub. Debt Required
Cummulative Sub Debt
Sub Debt Paid
Remaining For Dividends
Ilquity & Sub. Debt Cash Flow to Consoltinm:
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium
x1000 DRX
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
171,731,850 179,302,740 187,256,496 195,415,876 204,106,728 213,23, .220 222,831,946 232,916,940 243,519,873
(68,692,740) (71,721,096) (74,902,598) (78,166,350) (81,642,691) (85,294,888) (89,132,778) (93,166,776) (97,407,949)
103.039.110 107.581.644 112.353.898 1173249.525 122.464.07 -127.942.332 133.699.168 19750164 146.111.924
(15,455,866) (16,137,247) (16,853,085) (17,587,429) (18,369,606) (19,191,350) (20,054,875) (20,962,525) (21,916,789)
87583243 91.444.397 95.500.813 99.662.097. 104.094.431 108.750.982 113.644.292 118.787.640 124.195.135
(30,654,135) (32,005,539) (33,425,285) (34,881,734) (36,433,051) (38,062,844) (39,775,502) (41,575,674) (43,468,297)
56,929,108 59,438,858 62,075,528 64,780,363 67,661,380 70,688,138 73,868,790 77,211,966 80,726,838
9,720,481 7,582,335 5,260,309 2,738,589
24,862,160 27,000,306 29,322,332 31,844,053
34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641
22,346,467 24,856,217 27,492,887 30,197,721 67,661,380 70,688,138 73,868,790 77,211,966 80,726,838
22,346,467 24,856,217 27,492,887 30,197,721 67,661,380 70,688,138 73,868,790 77,211,966 80,726,838
22,346,467 24,856,217 27,492,887 30,197,721 67,661,380 70,688,138 73,868,790 77,211,966 80,726,838
22,346,487 24,8568,217 27,492,887 30,197,721 67,661,380 70,688,138 73,868,790 77,211,966 80,728,838
10,065,010 11,108,290 12,371,700 13,588,075 30,447,821 31,809,682 33,240,956 34,745,385 36,327,077
10,055,910 11,186,298 12,311,799 13,588,975 30,447,621 31,809,662 33.240,956 34.745,385 36,327,077
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Alternate 1 Capital Investment:
PROJECT YEAR
Name IAggregate 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Indirect costs (40%)
Terminal Building
Satellite
Police Building
Building & Ground Maint.
Mobile Equipment WS
IKA Clinic
Ramp Service
Sewage Plant
Air Mail
Control Tower
Fire/Rescue Station
Misc. Roadways
Employee Parking (S)
Passenger Parking
Earthworks
Aircraft Bridge
Airfield Light Sys & P S
Home Base:
Total:
x1000 DRX
208,130,000
84,712,455
19,887,539
3,642,699
7,072,771
2,674,504
4,356,217
2,741,413
8,264,436
2,365,877
24,277,608
4,581,539
5,489,239
981,815
733,500
69,992,766
5,902,791
9,256,169
59,126,375
524,189,713
81,191,298
7,624,121
1,789,879
13,451,208 27,036,302
18,636,740 28,802,235
4,375,259 6,761,763
692,113
4,809,484 2,263,287
2,112,858 561,646
2,657,292
740,182 2,001,231
44,783,996
29,649,359
6,960,639
2,950,586
1,524,676
7,768,570
1,040,986 1,324,891
2,184,985 5,341,074 8,254,387 8,497,163
2,703,108 1,740,985
93,317 1,756,556 1,838,895 1,619,326
225,817
168,705
2,099,783 14,698,481 29,396,962 23,797,540
5,194,456
2,776,851 5,090,893 1,388,425
591,264 15,964,121 36,658,353
41,667,196
174,249
495,866
137,446
181,145
755,998
564,795
706,335
5,912,638
94,983,382 69,289,956 135,065,221 174,253,487 50,597,667
Appendix 111-3-1
Sources and Uses During Construction:
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Sources
Airport Development Fund 65,685,241 6,656,708 10,730,980 11,257,844 20,648,499 16,391,212
Greek State Grant 44,286,062 11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555
EU Grant 73,810,103 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486
Ordinary Equity 39,857,535 19,928,768 19,928,768
Subordinate Debt 13,285,899 6,642,949 6,642,949
EIB Loan 303,210,895 30,321,090 30,321,090 66,706,397 121,284,358 54,577,961
Commercial Loan 95,455,282 9,545,528 9,545,528 21,000,162 38,182,113 17,181,951
Total Sources 635,591,016 102,619,083 80,121,638 155,060,160 209,639,011 88,151,124
Capital Expenditure 524,189,713 94,983,382 69,289,956 135,065,221 174,253,487 50,597,667
Operating Losses 37,311,945 4,242,490 4,830,857 7,314,649 10,860,704 10,063,246
Interest During Construction 74,089,358 3,393,211 6,000,824 12,680,291 24,524,820 27,490,212
Total Uses 635,591,016 102,619,083 80,121,638 155,060,160 209,639,011 88,151,124
x1000 DRX
Appendix 111-4-1
Debt Analysis:
1996 1997 1998 1999 20001 2001
Drawdown: I.
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commercial Loans:
Princinpal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
303,210,895
95,455,282
30,321,090
9,545,528
30,321,090 66,706,397
9,545,528 21,000,162
121,284,358 54,577,961
38,182,113 17,181,951
30,321,090 30,321,090 66,706,397 121,284,358 54,577,961
2,607,614
2,607,614
9,545,528
785,597
785,597
3,393,211
3,393,211
5,215,227 10,951,978
5,215,227 10,951,978
9,545,528
785,597
785,597
21,000,162
1,728,313
1,728,313
6,000,824 12,680,291
6,000,824 12,680,291
21,382,432 26,076,137
21,382,432 26,076,137
38,182,113
3,142,388
3,142,388
17,181,951
1,414,075
1,414,075
24,524,820 27,490,212
24,524,820 27,490,212
I I' CONSTRUCTION -
x1000 DRX
Repayment period (years):
8 years Interest only; Annuity thereafter
303,210,895
26,076,137
26,076,137
95,455,282
7,855,970
10,606,142
18,462,112
33,932,107
10,606,142
44,538,249
EIB rate:
AF(17y, 8.6%)
Annuity:
8.60%
8.768
34,582,641
Coii, Iank: 11,23%
Appendix 111-4-2
Debt Analysis:
Drawdown:
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commercial Loans:
Princinpal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
x1000 DRX
303,210,895 303,210,895 294,704,391
26,076,137
26,076,137
84,849,139
6,983,084
10,606,142
17,589,227
33,059,221
10,606,142
43,665,364
26,076,137
26,076,137
74,242,997
6,110,199
10,606,142
16,716,341
32,186,336
10,606,142
42,792,478
26,076,137
8,506,504
34,582,641
63,636,855
5,237,313
10,606,142
15,843,456
31,313,450
19,112,647
50,426,097
285,466,327 275,433,790 264,538,454
25,344,578
9,238,064
34,582,641
53,030,712
4,364,428
10,606,142
14,970,570
29,709,005
19,844,206
49,553,211
24,550,104
10,032,537
34,582,641
42,424,570
3,491,542
10,606,142
14,097,685
28,041,646
20,638,680
48,680,326
23,687,306
10,895,336
34,582,641
31,818,427
2,618,657
10,606,142
13,224,799
26,305,962
21,501,478
47,807,440
2002 2003 2004 2IU0IZuu Z0
Appendix 111-4-3
Debt Analysis:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Drawdown:
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal 252,706,120 239,856,205 225,901,197 210,746,059 194,287,578 176,413,668
Interest Payment 22,750,307 21,732,726 20,627,634 19,427,503 18,124,161 16,708,732
Principal Payment 11,832,334 12,849,915 13,955,008 15,155,138 16,458,480 17,873,910
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641
Commercial Loans:
Prlncinpal 21,212,285 10,606,142
Interest Payment 1,745,771 872,886
Principal Payment 10,606,142 10,606,142
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan 12,351,913 11,479,028
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE: 24,496,078 22,605,612 20,627,634 19,427,503 18,124,161 18,708,732
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT: 22,438,477 23,456,058 13,955,008 15,155,138 16,458,480 17,873,910
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE: 46,934,555 46,061,669 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641
x1000 DRX
Appendix 111-4-4
Debt Analysis:
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
IDrawdown:
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commercial Loans:
Princinpal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
I DI
x1000 DRX
157,002,602
15,171,575
19,411,066
34,582,641
15,171,575
19,411,066
34,582,641
135,922,185
13,502,224
21,080,418
34,582,641
13,502,224
21,080,418
34,582,641
113,028,851
11,689,308
22,893,334
34,582,641
11,689,308
88,166,691
9,720,481
24,862,160
34,582,641
9,720,481
61,166,385
7,582,335
27,000,306
34,582,641
7,582,335
31,844,053
5,260,309
29,322,332
34,582,641
5,260,309
0
2,738,589
31,844,053
34,582,641
2,738,589
22,893,334 24,862,160 27,000,306 29,322,332 31,844,053
34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641 34,582,641
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Cashflow From Operations:
Operating Revenue
Operating Costs
Gross Operating Income
ADF Received
Grants of Rights Fee (ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Avalqble for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt
Prncipal Payment
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investmen Cashflow:
Capital Expenditure
Grants'
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Equity Capital
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordinate Debt Drawdown
Senior Debt Capital
EIB Loan Construction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt
Net Pioject Cash Flow:
Value of Cash Reserve.
Remaining for Sub Debt
Sub. Debt Required
Cummulative Sub. Debt
Sub Debt Ppid
R.emaining For Dividends
Lq(uity & Sub De)bt Cash Fluw tu Coisuitium:
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium
x1000 DRX
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(4,242,490)
(4242.49Q)
10,411,857
(4,830,857)
(4,830.857)
11,065,109
(7,314,649)
(7.314.649)
13.806,523
(10,860,704)
(10.860.704)
16,870,851
(10,063,246)
(10,063,246)
13,012,690
._6. 9367_ _._6234252 _A6,4918- I 610147 2949&444
6,169,367
3,043,860
-
3.043,860
3,125,507
6,234,252
6,735,831
6,735,831
(501,580)
6,491,875
13,834,869
13,834,869
(7,342,994)
6,010,147
22,778,241
22,778,241
(16,768,094)
2,949,444
27,713,134
27,713,134
(24,763,690)
87,396,916
(50,222,172)
37.174,744
12,424,456
(320)
49,598.880
49,598,880
33,820,665
10,571,309
44,391,975
5,206.905
102,529,185
(58,671,705)
43.857.480
12,880,454
(320)
562737,A14
56,737,614
32,950,647
10,571,309
43,521,956
13,215,658
111,791,432
(63,642,234)
48.149.199
13,298,838
(320)
61.447.716
61,447,716
32,080,628
10,571,309
42,651,937
18,795,779
121,974,697
(69,073,612)
52.901.085
13,730,291
(320)
66,631.056
66,631,056
31,210,609
19,049,876
50,260,486
16,370,571
133,170,647
(75,009,361)
58.161.287
14,175,208
(320)
72.336.175
72,336,175
29,611,434
19,779,033
49,390,467
22,945,708
(94,983,382) (80,678,853) (144,118,410) (139,910,142) (62.654.820)
11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555 11,971,555
18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486
19,928,768
6,042,949
19,928,768
6,642,949
27,199,357 39,287,960 72,531.619 96,708,825 66,487,317
8,P62,761 12,368,432 22,834,028 30,445,371 20,931,192
35,762,118 51,656,392 95,365,647 127,154,196 87,418,509
5,206,905 13,215,658 18,795,779 16,370,571 22,945,708
5,206,905 18,422,563 37,218,342 53,588,912 59,603,529
- - 16,931,091
1,175,697 1,175,697 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394 2,351,394
1,175,697 2,351,394 4,702,787 7,054,181 9,405,575 11,756,968 14,108,362 16,459,755 1,880,058
- - 16,931,091
(2t, 11,717)
(19,928,768)
Consortium Debt&Equity irr:
Consortium Equity Irr:
S (20,0t 1,711)
- (19,928,768)
15.57%
16 68%
16,031,001
Assumptions
Those concerning traffic and individual projects are seen in Appendix II.
15% of Total Debt is required to be in reserve fund.
tubooldinate debt It for 10 yeats at 12%
I'oformia was built as In the linte Case; Not all shuets appear In this appendix
--Appendix 
IV-1-1
Appendix IV-1-2
Cashflow From Operations:
Operating Revenue
Operating Costs
Gross Operating Income
ADF Received
Grants of Rights Fee (ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Available for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt
Principal Payment
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investment Cashflow:
Capital Expenditure
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Eggity Cg Ital
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordinate Debt Drawdown
Senior Deb Capital,
EIB Loan Construction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt.
Net Project Cash Flow.
Value of Cash Reserve
Remaining for Sub Debt
Sub. Debt Required
Cummulative Sub Debt
Sub Debt Paid
Remaining For Dividends
Equity & Sub Debt Cash Flow to Consortium:
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium'
x1000 DRX
n0 2007 nnR 9Q 9n1 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
143,851,404 155,455,789 168,064,016 181,763,324 197,891,618 213,014.999 229,433,303 245,002,937 259,346,472 274,643,936
(80,624,100) (86,692,827) (93,253,051) (100,345,445) (108,528,873) (116,386,423) (124,875,904) (132,816,720) (140,010,876) (147,650,238)
63.227.304 68762961 74.810.965 81.417.879 89.362.746 96.628.576 104.557.399 112.186.217 119335,596 126993,698
14,594,190 15,025,223 15,468,661 15,924,867 16,394,219 16,747,416 17,114,541 17,495,007
(295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224) (295,224)
77526.270 83.492.960 89.984.401 97.047.522 105.461.740 113.080.767 121.376.715 129.386000 119040.372 126698.2473(41,664,130) (44,344,466)
77,526,270 83,492,960 89,984,401 97,047,522 105,461,740 113,080,767 121,376,715 129,386,000 77,376,242 82,354,008
27,949,551 26,219,567 24,415,627 22,531,370 20,559,887 19,363,698 18,064,637 16,653,856 15,121,748 13,457,879
20,570,897 21,430,862 22,364,783 23,379,022 13,909,176 15,105,365 16,404,427 17,815,207 19,347,315 21,011,184
48,520,448 47,650,429 46,780,410 45,910,392 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064
29,005,822 35,842,531 43,203,991 51,137,130 70,992,677 78,611,704 86,907,652 94,916,936 42,907,178 47,884,944
29,005,822 35,842,531 43,203,991
59,603,529
29,005,822 35,842,531 43,203,991
2,351,394 1,175,697 1,175,697
4,231,452 1,175,697 1,175,697
24,774,370 34,666,834 42,028,204
15,379,918 16,775,772 20,088.,429
11,148,467 15,600,075 18,912,732
51,137,130 70,992,677 78,611,704 86,907,652 94,916,936 42,907,178 47,884,944
51,137,130 70,992,677 78,611,704 86,907,652 94,916,936 42,907,178 47,884,944
51,137,130 70,902,677 78,611,704 86,907,652 94,916,93Q 42,9007,178 47,884,944
23,011,709 31,946,705 35,375,267 39,108,443 42,712,621
23.011,709 31,946,705 35,375,267 39,108,443 42,712,621
19,308,230 21,548,225
19,308,230 21,548,225
Y
Appendix IV-1i -3
Cashflow From Operations:
Operating Revenue
Operating Costs
Gross Operating Income
ADF Received
Grants of Rights Fee (ADA Schedule 2)
EBITD
Tax Payable
Cash Available for Senior Debt Service
Interest Payment on Senior Debt
Principal Payment
Senior Debt Service
CASH FROM OPERATIONS NET OF DEBT SERVICE
Investment Cashflow:
Capital Expenditure
Grants
Greek Government Grant
EU Grant
Eslty CapitnL.
Ordinary Equity Drawdown
Subordinate Debt Drawdown
Senior Deb Capital.
EIB Loan Construction Amount
Commercial Loan Construction Amount
Total Debt
Net Piojecot Cash Flow:
Value of Cash Reserve.
Remaining for Sub Debt
Sub. Debt Required
Cummulative Sub Debt
Sub Debt Ppid
Remaining For Dividends
Equity & Sub Debt Cash Flow to Consortium:
Equity Cash Flow to Consortium'
x1000 DRX
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
288,766,529 303,728,250 317,738,823 332,469,461 346,337,908 361,904.973 378,252,324 395,421,292 413,455,348 432,400,469
(154,516,084) (161,759,949) (168,641,371) (175,853,366) (182,741,672) (190,367,754) (198.352,349) (206,713,634) (215,470,706) (224,643,729)
134.250.445 141.968.302 149.097.452 156.616.095 _16359 .3 171.537.219 179.899.975 188.707.658 197.984.643 207.756741
(20,137,567) (21,295,245) (22,364,618) (23,492,414) (24,539,435) (25,730.583) (26,984,996) (28,306,149) (29,697,696) (31,163,511)
1 4-112.87 _120673.05 126.732,834 133.123.681 139.05.800 145.806.636 152914979 160401.509 16286946 17659323
(39,939,507) (42,235,570) (44,356,492) (46,593,288) (48,669,800) (51,032,323) (53,520,243) (56,140,528) (58,900,431) (61,807,630)
74,173,371 78,437,487 82,376,342 86,530,392 90,386,920 94,774,313 99,394,736 104,260,981 109,386,515 114,785,599
11,650,917 9,688,557 7,557,433 5,243,033 2,729,594
22,818,146 24,780,507 26,911,630 29,226,031 31,739,469
34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064
39,704,307 43,968,423 47,907,278 52,061,329 55,917,856 94,774,313 99,394,736 104,260,981 109,386,515 114,785,599
30,704,307 43,068,423 47,007,278 52,061,329 55,017,856 94,774,313 99,304,736 104,280,981 100,386,515 114,785,599
39,704,307 43,968,423 47,907,278 52,061,329 55,917,856 94,774,313 99,394,736 104,260,981 109,386,515 114,785,599
39,704,307 43,968,424 47,907,278 52,061,329 55,917,856 94,774,313 99,394,736 104,260,981 109,386,515 114,785,599
17,866,038 10,/85,700 21,558,275b 23,427,508 25,183,035 42,848,441 44,727,631 46,917,441 40,223,932 51,653,520
17,866,938 19,785,790 21,558,275 23,427,598 25,163,035 42,648,441 44,727,631 46,917,441 49,223,932 51,653,520
Appendix IV-2-1
Alternate 2 Capital Investments:
PROJECT YEAR
Name Aggregate 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Indirect cpsts (40%)
Terminal Building
Satellite
Police Building
Building & Ground Maint.
Mobile Equipment WS
IKA Clinic
Ramp Service
Building
Equipment
Cargo Facility
Air Mail
Veterinary Building
Forwarders Building
Control Tower
Fire/Rescue Station
Runways
Taxlways/Aprons
Misc. Roadways
Employee Parking (S)
Passenger Parking
Earthworks
Total:
x1000 DRX
208,130,000
84,712,455
19,887,539
3,642,699
7,072,771
2,674,504
4,356,217
2,741,413
17,135,000
6,632,450
2,365,877
480,000
681,600
24,277,608
4,581,539
14,780,779
40,00995,835
5,489,239
981,815
733,500
69,992,766
522,345,606
81,191,298
7,624,121
1,789,879
13,451,208 27,036,302
18,636,740 28,802,235
4,375,259 6,761,763
692,113
4,809,484 2,263,287
2,112,858 561,646
2,657,292
74Q,182 2,001,231
66,325 2,387,682
1,040,986
11Q,400 369,600
231,744 449,856
2,184,985
93,317
2,099,783
94,983,382
44,783,996
29,649,359
6,960,639
2,950,586
41,667,196
1,524,676 174,249
3,913,146
1,324,891
5,341,074 8,254,387 8,497,163
2,703,108 1,740,985
5,173,273 7,833,813
14,348,542 21,727,79 4,919,500
1,756,556 1,838,895 1,619,326
225,817
168,705
14,698,481 29,396,962 23,797,540
80,678,853 144,118,410 139,910,142
17,135,000
265,2968
137,446
1,773,693
181,145
755,998
564,795
62,654,820
Appendix IV-3-1
Sources and Uses During Construction:
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Sources
Airport Development Fund 65,167,027 10,411,857 11,065,109 13,806,523 16,870,851 13,012,690
Greek State Grant 44,286,Q62 11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555 11,071,555
EU Grant 73,810,103 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486 18,452,486
Ordinary Equity 39,857,535 19,928,768 19,928,768
Subordinate Debt 13,285,899 6,642,949 6,642,949
EIB Loan 302,215,078 27,199,357 39,287,960 72,531,619 98,708,825 66,487,317
Commermial Loan 95,141,784 8,562,761 12,368,432 22,834,028 30,445,371 20,931,192
Total Sources 633,763,486 102,269,732 92,245,542 165,267,928 173,549,087 100,431,199
uses
Capital Expenditure 522,345,§06 94,983,382 80,678,853 144,118,410 130,910,142 62,654,820
Operating Losses 37,311,945 4,242,490 4,830,857 7,314,649 10,860,704 10,063,246
Interest During Construction 74,105,935 3,043,860 6,735,831 13,834,869 22,778,241 27,713,134
Total Uses 633,763,486 102,269,732 92,245,542 165,267,928 173,549,087 100,431,199
x1000 DRX
Appendix IV-4-1
Debt Analysis:
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000[ 2001
Drawdown: I I
EIB
Commerlal Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commerqlal Loans:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
x1000 DRX
302,215,078
95,141,784
27,199,357 39,287,960 72,531,619
8,562,761 12,368,432 22,834,028
27,199,357
2,339,145
39,287,960 72,531,619
5,717,909 11,955,628
2,339,145 5,717,909 11,955,628
8,562,761
704,715
704,715
3,043,860
3,043,860
12,368,432
1,017,922
1,017,922
22,834,028
1,879,241
1,879,241
6,735,831 13,834,869
6,735,831 13,834,869
CONSTRUCTION
96,708,825 66,487,317
30,445,371 20,931,192
96,706,825 66,487,317
20,272,587 25,990,497
20,272,587 25,990,497
30,445,371
2,505,654
2,505,654
20,931,192
1,722,637
1,722,637
22,778,241 27,713,134
22,778,241 27,713,134
P,-,.
302,215,078
25,990,497
25,990,497
95,141,784
7,830,169
10,571,309
18,401,478
33,820,665
10,571,309
44,391,975
8.60% Repayment period (years):
8.768 0 years Interest only; Annuity thereafter
34,469,064
Comm, Bank: 8.23%
EIB rate:
AF(17y, 8.6%)
Annuity:
Appendix IV-4-2
Debt Analysis:
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Drawdown:
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
Commercial Loans:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
302,215,078
25,990,497
25,990,497
84,570,474
6,960,150
10,571,309
17,531,459
32,950,647
10,571,309
43,521,956
302,215,078 293,736,511
25,990,497 25,990,497
8,478,567
25,990,497 34,469,064
73,999,165
6,090,131
10,571,309
16,661,441
32,080,628
10,571,309
42,651,937
63,427,856
5,220,113
10,571,309
15,791,422
31,210,609
19,049,876
50,260,486
284,528,787
25,261,340
9,207,724
34,469,064
52,856,546
4,350,094
10,571,309
14,921,403
29,611,434
19,779,033
49,390,467
274,529,199
24,469,476
9,999,588
34,469,064
42,285,237
3,480,075
10,571,309
14,051,384
27,949,551
20,570,897
48,520,448
263,669,646
23,609,511
10,859,553
34,469,064
31,713,928
2,610,056
10,571,309
13,181,366
26,219,567
21,430,862
47,650,429
xI DRXx1000 DRX
Appendix IV-4-3
Debt Analysis:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Drawdown:
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal 251,876,172 239,068,459 225,159,283 210,053,918 193,649,491 175,834,283
Interest Payment 22,675,590 21,661,351 20,559,887 19,363,698 18,064,637 16,653,856
Principal Payment 11,793,474 12,807,713 13,909,176 15,105,365 16,404,427 17,815,207
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064
Commercial Loans:
Principal 21,142,619 10,571,309
Interest Payment 1,740,038 870,019
Principal Payment 10,571,309 10,571,309
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan 12,311,347 11,441,328
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE: 24,415,627 22,531,370 20,559,887 19,363,698 18,064,637 16,653,856
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT: 22,364,783 23,379,022 13,909,176 15,105,365 16,404,427 17,815,207
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE: 46,780,410 45,910,392 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064
x1000 DRX
Appendix IV-4-4
Debt Analysis:
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
D rawdown: i
EIB
Commercial Bank
EIB Loan:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on EIB Loan
ICommercial Loans:
Principal
Interest Payment
Principal Payment
Total Debt Service on Comm. Loan
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE:
TOTAL PRINCIPAL PAYMENT:
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE:
I000 DRXx1000 DRX
156,486,968
15,121,748
19,347,315
34,469,064
15,121,748
19,347,315
34,469,064
135,475,784
13,457,879
21,011,184
34,469,064
13,457,879
21,011,184
34,469,064
112,657,637
11,650,917
22,818,146
34,469,064
11,650,917
87,877,130
9,688,557
24,780,507
34,469,064
9,688,557
60,965,500
7,557,433
26,911,630
34,469,064
7,557,433
31,739,469
5,243,033
29,226,031
34,469,064
5,243,033
0
2,729,594
31,739,469
34,469,064
2,729,594
22,818,146 24,780,507 26,911,630 29,226,031 31,739,469
34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064 34,469,064
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